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ABSTRACT 
This  thesis  is  based  on  the  empirical  examination  of  the  impact  of  divestiture
announcements,  with  a  focus  on  spin-off  and  sell-off  transactions,  on  the  share
performance of parent companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in
South Africa. The sample of the study for spin-off consisted of 36 companies while that
of sell-off  transactions consisted of 41 companies listed on JSE for deals that were
announced  and  concluded  from  2006  to  2016.  The  cumulative  average  abnormal
returns for the parent companies were calculated using the event study methodology
over the entire event window. Abnormal returns were calculated using the two-factor
APT model approach. The cumulative average abnormal returns significance was tested
using  the  t-test.  Thereafter,  the  average  abnormal  returns  and  cumulative  average
abnormal  returns  were  compared  over  the  event  window  for  the  pre  and  post
announcement  period.  A comparison  was  also  made  between  spin-off  and  sell-off
transactions  over  the  entire  event  window  (-30,  +30).  Three  key  results  were
established, the first being that, spin-off transactions generate positive abnormal returns
while sell-off transaction generate negative abnormal returns. Second, it is clear that
there  were  significant  positive  cumulative  average  abnormal  returns  for  post-
announcement returns for spin-off transactions while the post-announcement returns for
sell-off transactions generated a negative cumulative average abnormal returns. Thirdly,
I compared the two form of divestiture (spin-off and sell-off transactions) and discovered
that there appears to be significant evidence that the CAAR for spin-off transactions are
higher than the CAAR for sell-off transactions.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
Divestment or Divestiture is a corporate strategy which involves partial or full disposal of
a business unit or asset. This research study examined the impact of divestitures (spin-
offs and sell-offs transactions) announcements on the share performance of the parent
firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in South Africa.  There are
various types of divestiture that can be undertaken by an organization as it pursues
corporate strategy, but this study focused on spin-offs and sell-offs transactions. The
study  examined  the  impact  of  divestitures  on  the  share  performance  of  parent
companies  and  not  the  reasons  why  such  corporate  actions  are  taken  by  top
management.  Any  study  on  the  reason  for  such  corporate  action  would  be  better
conducted in  Business Management  and not  in  Finance,  the  reason being that  the
impact of divestitures is likely to be more quantitative, while the reason for a corporate
action like divestitures will most likely be qualitative. 
The  first  chapter  introduces  the  research  and  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  1.1
presents the background on divestitures (spin-offs and sell-offs) as a form of corporate
actions taken by management to achieve a particular objective. Section 1.2 provides a
background to the study by outlining key the research problems. Section 1.3 presents
the  research  objectives.  Section  1.4  explains  the  research  questions.  Section  1.5
highlights  the  significance  of  the  study  and  in  particular  its  contribution  to  the
divestitures  (spin-offs  and  sell-offs)  body  of  knowledge.  Section  1.6  concludes  the
chapter.
1.1 Definition of Spin-offs and sell-offs transactions
It is essential to distinguish between a spin-off and a sell-off transaction since the focus
of the study was limited to these two corporate actions. A spin-off results in the creation
of  a  new entity, i.e.,  a  new company will  be established from an existing company
usually referred to as the parent company. The new entity’s shares are allotted among
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the shareholders of the parent company on a pro rata basis. The shares are usually
allotted  on  the  basis  of  their  holdings  in  the  parent  company  before  the  spin-offs
transactions. Spin-offs transactions essentially lead or give birth to a new company. A
good example was when Pick and Pay Holdings Limited gave birth to Pick and Pay
Stores Limited. 
A sell-off is when a company disposses off some of its subsidiaries or assets for cash or
any  other  form  of  consideration  or  payment  agreed  upon  by  the  parties  to  the
transactions.A sell-off is an outright sales to a third party. The third party can be their
competitor, a new company in the industry  or  any other  interested party  such as a
foreign  company  looking  for  a  presence  in  that  particular  industry.  In  a  spin-off
transaction,  ‘parent-firm shareholders  receive  a  pro-data  distribution  of  stock  in  the
newly formed company’ (Terry at al., 2000, p.278). Sell-offs transactions do not result in
a reduction of the parent company. Sell-offs transactions usually lead to a complete
take-over of the organization (Terry at al., 2000).
1.2  Background of the Study
In considering the background of this study, it is essential to begin by making a clear
distinction  between  spin-offs  and  sell-offs  transaction  as  a  form  of  corporate
restructuring or re-organization.
Divestment or Divestiture 
Divestment or Divestiture is a corporate term which describes partial or full disposal of a
business unit with the intention of focusing on the more profitable ones or for other
strategic reasons best known to top management. It is important to note here that profit
is not the only reason for divesting, although it is generally believed to be the primary
reason. Other reasons, apart from profit may be as a result of the company exiting a
particular  industry  or  country  or  an  effect  of  government  regulations.  An  excellent
example of when government regulations led to divestment was in Nigeria’s banking
sector in 2010. Before this regulation, Nigerian banks operated a boutique of financial
services, including: insurance, stockbroking, pension funds, et cetera. It was uncovered
in 2011 that most banks were making losses from the core business of banking, but
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these losses were either not reported or they were underreported. In order to prevent
the collapse of the banks, the Central  Bank of Nigeria took a pro-active decision to
scrap their Universal Banking Licenses. This decision compelled the banks to divest
from non-core banking activities such as: insurance and stockbroking. 
Divestment is a form of corporate action undertaken by top management. Companies
generally  expand  over  time,  and  when  this  happens,  the  company  becomes  very
challenging to manage in most cases. In most instances, this expanding company loses
its strategic mission and hence divesting might be a good option. There are different
reasons for considering corporate restructuring in any organization, but this is not the
focus of this research.
When  an  organization  decides  to  divest,  the  structure  of  its  ownership  changes
depending on the form of  divestiture  undertaken.  These changes are  not  limited  to
ownership alone. Capital structures and some other things are likely to change.  An
organization can divest its holdings in many ways, but the two most common types are
either through a spin-off transaction or a sell-off transaction. 
There are existing works of literature that provide some answers as to why companies
divest, whether through spin-offs or sell-offs. However, there are still some fundamental
questions regarding the driving factors and differences between these two forms of
divestitures (Prezas and Karen, 2015).  Some important questions to ask according to
Prezas and Karen (2015) are: "Does pre-divestiture market valuation of divesting firms
affect their choice between spin-offs and sell-offs? Do firms divesting through spin-offs
realize more significant improvements in their post-divestiture performance compared to
those divesting through sell-offs? Do market conditions at the time of divestiture affect a
firm's choice of divestiture form? Why is it that the announcement effects of spin-offs are
in general larger than those of sell-offs?" (Prezas and Karen, 2012, p.1) It is vital for
management to look at these critical  and fundamental  questions before divesting or
deciding to divest.
According to Nixon et al., (2000), for an organization to accomplish its corporate goals
and objectives, it must take certain decisions including and not limited to the decision to
divest some of its assets. As indicated earlier, spin-offs and sell-offs transactions are
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two common ways of divesting assets. The impact of each on the divesting company
are usually different (Nixon et al., 2000) Sell-offs and spin-offs transactions are used by
companies  to  divest  portions  of  their  assets,  and  studies  have  found  that  both
transactions are associated with positive share price reactions for divesting companies
(Hite and Owers, 1983). A spin-off results in the creation or birth of a new company. The
new company’s shares are allotted among the shareholders of the parent company on a
pro rata basis i.e. from their  holdings with the parent company. A sell-off  is when a
company disposses off some of its subsidiaries or assets for cash or any other form of
consideration  or  payment  agreed upon by  the  parties  to  the  transactions.  A sell-off
transaction is an outright sales of a division or asset to a third party who can be even its
competitors or a new company in the industry. A spin-off results in the creation of a new
entity,  i.e.,  a  new  company  will  be  established  from  the  existing  company  usually
referred to as the parent's company. (Terry at al., 2000).
Bowman et  al.,  (1999)  posit  that  there  are  three  significant  reasons  why  company
executives  or  top  management  restructure  their  organization.  According  to  their
research, this can be done to reduce costs, to improve productivity or to add to the
shareholders’ value. Based on their summary of findings from various studies conducted
in 1990,  they classified restructuring activities under  three major  headings:  portfolio
restructuring,  financial  restructuring  and  organizational  restructuring.  According  to
Bowman at al., (1999), any changes in the capital structure of a firm would be classified
as  financial  restructuring,  i.e.  the  combination  of  debt  and  equity  capital,  "including
leveraged buyouts, leveraged recapitalizations and debt for equity swaps" (Bowman at
al.,1999,p.35).  Organizational  restructuring  can  consist  of  changes  in  the  corporate
ownership  of  the  firm.  This  includes  but  is  not  limited  to,  “redrawing  of  divisional
boundaries among its various divisions or units, flattening of hierarchic levels to improve
efficiency, spreading of the span of control, reducing product diversification to gain more
market share, revising compensation to encourage productivity, streamlining processes
to  reduce  waste,  reforming  governance  and  downsizing  employment”  (  Bowman at
al.,1999,p.44). 
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According to Gaughan (2010), mergers and acquisitions are usually implemented for
expansion  while  divestiture  is  usually  for  the  purpose  of  contracting  or  downsizing
operations. A company might divest if a division is no longer profitable, when it is losing
its market share or if  a previous merger or acquisition was unsuccessful  (Gaughan,
2010). If a merger or acquisition is not producing the strategic result, the obvious thing
to  do is  to  divest  either  through a  spin-off  transaction  or  sell-off  transactions or  by
whatever form of divestment the organization finds suitable.
Eckbo  and  Thorburn  (2013)  reviewed literature  on  corporate  financial  restructuring,
including  breakup  transactions  such  as  divestitures,  spin-offs  carve-outs,  leveraged
recapitalizations  and  leveraged  buyouts  (LBOs),  aimed  at  seeking  out  the  motives
behind  corporate  reorganization  and  establishing  if  the  type  of  selection  tools  for
restructuring  were  influenced  by  the  kind  of  transaction.  They  infer  that  many
restructuring strategies are usually reactions to excessive conglomeration and reverse
costly diversification discount. Their study revealed that corporate restructuring may be
introduced by top management or outside sponsors like buyout funds. They also noted
that sometimes, in order to address arising ‘threat from the market for corporate control’,
(Eckbo and Thorburn, 2013, p.162) the defensive restructuring is undertaken to unlock
value  by  selling  underperforming  assets  to  increase the  value  of  a  company  to  its
shareholders.
Rappaport (1986) posited that the consideration of a corporate strategy is based on
whether or not it adds value to the shareholder. According to Rappaport (1986), the
shareholder  value  is  the  only  real  standard  for  business  performance.  Although,
shareholder value is regarded as a significant standard for business performance, this
does not to imply that there are no other measures for business performance. The best
form of any business performance measure is the one that can be easily quantifiable.
Shareholder values are easily and readily quantifiable, so they present one of the best
methods to use to measure the impact of divestiture that is undertaken in this research.
Rappaport (1986) outlines the shortcomings of other business performance standards
or measurements such as earnings per share, return of investment and return on equity.
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He presents a model to measure and determine shareholder value which can easily be
measured by the rise in market capitalization on the stock exchange. 
More studies have been conducted on mergers and acquisitions when compared to
studies on spin-offs and sell-offs transactions (Erika, 2014). The simple reason is that
many market participants see mergers and acquisitions in a more positive light, while
sell-offs  and spin-offs transactions are often perceived negatively  ;  people generally
think  that  "adding  up"  will  always  be  better  or  will  produce  a  better  result  than
"subtracting from" (Erika, 2014). This assumption is logical from a mathematical point of
view. The addition of two numbers generally leads to an increase while the subtraction
of two numbers would likely lead to a reduction.  
It is important to note at this juncture, that the purpose of this research was neither to
find out why companies restructure nor to establish which form of corporate restructures
best suit a particular organization. Rather, the study sought to empirically determine if
divestitures,  as  a  form  of  corporate  restructuring  can  add  or  create  value  to
shareholders.  Managers  do  not  do  things  for  the  fun  of  it  but  rather  to  achieve  a
particular objective at the end of the day. The impact of such decisions formed the basis
of the study and also served as a navigational system to reach a conclusion.
1.3  Research Problems
There  is  a  variety  of  academic  studies  on  divestiture,  with  focused on  reasons for
divestiture  and  what  form  of  divestment  best  aligns  to  the  corporate  goals  and
objectives  of  an  organization.  Very  few studies  have  examined  the  impact  of  such
strategies on the performance of the organization in South Africa as most of the studies
have been conducted in developed markets especially in the US and Europe. This study
contributes  to  knowledge  on  the  effects  such  corporate  actions  on  the  share
performance of parent companies in South Africa.
Erika (2014) conducted a study on the circumstances that make spin-off transactions a
good strategy in the Airline Industry in the United States. He concluded that spin-offs
were a smart strategy if the goals and objectives of the spun-off unit are separate from
the goals and objectives of the parent companies. In other words, the spin-off division
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should not be allowed to do the same thing; the parent companies are doing. Spin-off
transactions only add value to shareholders if  they operate in a completely different
environment. An example similar to this is the case of MultiChoice Nigeria, the leading
pay television services in Nigeria. When it was launched it only offered DSTV services
but in order to compete favourably with StarTimes (which was targeting the low-end of
the market segments), MultiChoice spun-off GOtv Services. Currently both, DStv and
GOtv services are operating in the same market space in Nigeria. This is a clear case of
when a spun-off division does or operate in the same market.
According to Donghun and Ravi (2010), there have been numerous empirical studies to
examine  the  relationship  between  corporate  divestiture  and  subsequent  firm
performance in both developed and developing market. However, these studies were
characterized by inconsistent findings. Donghun and Ravi conducted a meta-analysis of
the divestiture-performance relationship using 650 effect sizes from 94 reviews. They
found out  that  among these studies,  corporate divestiture  had a positive  impact  on
company performance. In order to further substantiate the claim of a positive impact,
there is a need for more research to be done in this regard, hence the relevance of this
study.  
Lea (2009) examined a sample of Danish sell-offs transactions undertaken in the period
from 2002 until April 2009. Results showed an average abnormal return on the day of
the  announcement  of  1.29%,  but  the  effect  was  not  statistically  significant.  The
component  of  the  abnormal  return  generated by  his  findings is  in  line  with  several
similar event studies on the sell-off transactions carried out on samples of American
sell-offs. His result, however, showed a negative cumulative average abnormal return of
-1.96%  after  the  announcement.  This  indicates  that  the  positive  effect  on  the
announcement  day  disappeared  during  the  30  days  after  the  announcement.  He
concluded that Danish sell-offs add marginal value to shareholders wealth on the day of
the  announcement,  but  that  this  value  tends  to  vanish  in  the  period  post  the
announcement.  His conclusion is a bit  strange. There is an abnormal return on the
announcement date, but the cumulative average abnormal return is negative within 30
days.  The  conclusion  for  Danish  Companies  is  a  situation  whereby  we  have
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shareholders benefitting only in the short term. The long-term value added is negative
for shareholders.  
Francis et al., (2005) discussed different forms of corporate divestitures and the reasons
for  these  corporate  actions.  They  used  some  samples  of  corporate  divestitures  to
identify the primary motivations in the Singapore context.  For Singapore companies,
operational efficiency, increased profitability and liquidity are the three major reasons for
embarking on divestitures. They used price data around the announcement dates, and
they proved that returns on the parent company increased significantly on divestitures
announcements.  They concluded that corporate divestiture adds value for Singapore
companies.
Sebastian (2014) examined the wealth effects of 90 completed spin-offs in the United
Kingdom that  were  announced  between  January  1987  and  December  2010.  Other
factors such as the change in corporate focus, the level of information asymmetry, the
relative size, board monitoring effectiveness, and takeover interest were investigated as
possible sources of the wealth effects, i.e., the spin-offs effect was not the only factor
considered in this study. His result showed a significant positive wealth effect of 4.46%
over  the  three-day  window.  There  was  no  evidence  for  long-term  wealth  effects
associated with a spin-off, as the results are mostly insignificant. His conclusion was
similar  to  that  of  Lea  (2009)  who  found  that  Danish  companies  showed  positive
abnormal average returns in the short term, but not in the long run.
Emily et al., (2014) examined the impact of divestitures (spin-offs and sell-offs) on the
wealth of shareholders for the parent firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange
over the period 1995-2011. The study also made a comparison of the wealth created by
spin-offs versus sells offs transactions. Results showed significant negative cumulative
abnormal returns over the 250 and 500 days respectively, after the announcement date.
This finding pointed to the fact that divestitures in South Africa do not add value to
shareholders’  wealth  in  the  long  run.  In  addition,  sell-offs  transactions  are  a  better
choice of divestitures compared to spin-offs transactions. The study by Emily et  al.,
(2014) left us with a big question: Do divestitures in South Africa add value in the short
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term? This question in turn informed the focus of this research; it looks at the short-term
impact rather than the long-term impact. 
Matthias and Markus (2010) examined sources of divestiture gains in the insurance
industry.  Their  study  was  unique  for  comparing  performance  between  programme
divestiture  and  “stand-alone”  divestitures.  They  define  “divestiture  programme  as
groups of (unit) divestitures that adjust the corporate focus of a firm according to an
explicitly announced strategic logic” (Matthias and Markus, 2010, p.85). In a programme
divestiture, an organization embarks on a series of transactions in order to implement
their  corporate  strategy.  For  “stand-alone”  divestitures,  the  organization  uses  one
transaction  to  achieve  its  corporate  strategy.  Using  event  study  methodology,  they
analyzed  abnormal  returns  of  160  divestiture  announcements  within  the  global
insurance  industry  between  1998  and  2007.  Their  findings  shows  that  programme
divestitures generate higher positive abnormal returns than “stand-alone” divestitures.
Furthermore,  they  looked  at  what  might  been  responsible  for  the  higher  abnormal
returns in  programme divestitures. They considered two factors:  experience transfer
and timing. By experience transfer, they considered if management has been this kind
of divestiture in the past and by timing, they referred to how the divestiture has been
scheduled for effective execution. Looking at these two factors, it was discovered that
experience transfer does not have any impact on the announcement returns. However,
timing of the divestitures did have positive impact on the announcement returns.
Meijui  (2012)  examined  the  performance  of  divestiture  announcements  on  listed
companies  in  Taiwan.  She  considered  two  specific  kinds  of  divestitures:  sell-offs
transactions and equity carve-outs. He analyzed 266 sell-offs transactions and equity
carve-outs  between  1995  and  2004.  She  looked  at  both  short-term  and  long-term
performance. For short-term performance, she measured the abnormal stock returns
while  she used financial  ratios to  measure  the long-term performance.  Her  findings
showed positive abnormal stock returns associated with divestiture announcement for
listed companies in Taiwan.
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Jain (1985) examined the effect of voluntary sell-offs announcements on shareholder
wealth in the United States between 1976 and 1978. Past researches have limited the
effect of divestitures on sellers and most importantly companies listed on a recognized
stock exchanges. Jain studied the effects not just on the sellers but also on the buyers.
He  used  a  sample  of  over  1000  voluntary  sell-offs,  specifically  for  first  time
announcements.  His  findings  showed  that  both  sellers  and  buyers  earn  significant
positive  abnormal  returns  from  these  transactions.  However,  the  abnormal  returns
earned by sellers are higher than the abnormal returns earned by buyers. Furthermore,
sell-off announcements are preceded by significant negative returns before the sell-off
activities. 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) did a very interesting study by comparing acquisitions and
divestitures announcements in the United States. They examined 1305 firms from 59
industries between 1990 and 1999. Their findings on the two form of restructuring i.e.
acquisitions and divestitures in the 1900s increased shareholders wealth. In addition,
their results also showed that 50 percent of the firm are either involved in acquisitions or
one  form of  major  divestitures.  Finally, economic  reasons  was  the  major  driver  for
restructuring during this period. 
Rosenfeld  (1984)  investigated  additional  evidence  on  the  relationship  between
divestiture announcements and shareholders wealth in the United States. Two types of
voluntary  divestitures  announcements  were  considered:  spin-off  and  sell-off
announcements. He found out that both spin-off and sell-off transactions have positive
abnormal returns on divesting firms. In addition, spin-off transactions outperformed sell-
off transactions on the day of the event. 
Most research on corporate divestitures and its impact on shareholders’ wealth have
been conducted mostly for listed companies on a recognized stock exchange. However,
Feldman et  al.,  (2016)  investigated  the  relationship  between  firm’s values  in  family
companies. Since these family companies are mostly not listed on the stock exchange,
they used hand collected data on a sample of over 30,000 family businesses. Their
findings showed that non-family companies are likely to embark on a divestiture than a
family owned companies, especially if the family owned companies are managed by a
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family member. Furthermore, it was established that divestitures undertaken by family
companies  generated  higher  post-announcement  returns  when  compared  to
divestitures undertaken by non-family companies. The significance of their study was to
show  that  family  businesses  may  pursue  objectives  beyond  shareholders  wealth
maximization  such  as  “preserving  the  founder’s  legacy  and  heritage,  creating
employment  opportunities  for  family  members,  and maintaining  family  harmony and
social status” ( Feldman et al., 2016, p.2). These multiples objectives may hinder them
to exploit available economic opportunities. 
Desai and Jain (1999), examined if corporate focus was responsible for stock market
gains associated with spin-offs. According to them, corporate focus can take two forms:
selling unrelated assets to others or by spinning off unrelated divisions. They considered
155 spinoffs between 1975 and 1999. They found out that there was higher long-run
abnormal returns for focus-increasing spin-offs than for non-focus-increasing spinoffs.
Most studies on spin-offs and sell-offs have been conducted in developed countries
such as, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and in European countries
(Mthabisi, 2017, p.12). The fundamental question to ask is if these results are a true
reflection or representation of what  is obtainable in the emerging markets.  There is
limited research on spin-offs and sell-offs events in South Africa hence this study’s focus
on spin-off transactions and sell-off transactions therein. The study bridges the gap in
knowledge by looking at the impact of spin-offs and sell-offs announcements on the
stock price performance of JSE listed companies. In addition to this, the period under
consideration for these studies carried out in South Africa is usually short. The study
examined these impacts over a period of ten years.
1.4  Research objective
The  study  sought  to  analyse  whether  the  announcement  of  spin-offs  and  sell-offs
creates value for the shareholders of the parent companies listed on the JSE in South
Africa.
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1. The study will investigate the reaction of the stock prices of parent firms during spin-
offs and sell-offs announcements period, to establish whether value was being created
to the shareholders of the parent companies in the short term period.
2. The study also investigated if there was a difference between the abnormal returns (if
any) generated pre-announcement and post-announcement.
3.  The  study  then  examined  the  forms  of  divestitures  (Spin-offs  or  Sell-Offs)  that
produced more abnormal returns (if any).
1.5  Research Questions
In line with the aforementioned objectives, the research sought to answer the following
specific questions:
1. Do Spin-offs and Sell-offs announcements yield abnormal returns for the share price
of parent companies listed on the JSE, during and around the announcement periods?
2. What are the differences between the pre and post-announcement returns, and how
significant are the differences if they exist?
3. What is the difference in returns between a spin-offs transactions and a sell-offs
transactions and how significant are the differences if they exist?
1.6 Significance of the study
In most cases, many studies have used small samples and the results from these small
samples are difficult  to generalize on a larger population.This study covered a large
sample period of over ten years (2006 – 2016).
Divestment, whether through spin-off transactions or sell-off transactions is becoming
popular in South Africa. This study will help market participants decides what form of
divestment to undertake. 
Spin-offs and sell-offs transactions are usually seen as a means of improving financial
performance  of  a  company.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  they  are  adopted  by  top
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management or shareholders. However, various studies on this subject have produced
a set of conflicting results  (Donghun and Ravi, 2010). As a result, the findings of this
research will add to existing body of knowledge.
1.7 Outline of the research.
This thesis comprises five chapters, Chapter 1 being the introduction section. Chapter 2
provides a literature review of the earlier research on spin-offs and sell-offs transactions.
Chapter 3 explains the research methodology that will be followed to address research
questions.  Chapter  4  will  analyze  and  interpret  the  data  collected,  followed  by  a
summary of findings and suggestions for further research in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 Introduction
This  chapter  summarizes relevant  studies from a large body of  literature related to
divestitures  and  shareholder  value  in  developed  markets  and  emerging  ones.
Fundamental concepts, theories, and definitions were also reviewed to illustrate their
relevance  to  this  research.  Section  2.1  defines  divestitures  as  a  form of  corporate
strategy. Section 2.2 looks at the historical trends in the area of divestitures especially,
spin-offs and sell-offs. Section 2.3 sheds more light on different forms of divestitures,
but with a focus on spin-offs and sell-offs transactions. Section 2.4 will  consider the
reason why an organization divests. Even though this is not the focus of this study, the
insight  will  be  helpful.  Section  2.5  differentiate  between  spin-offs  and  sell-offs
transactions.  Section  2.6  dives  into  the  market  efficiency  hypothesis.  Section  2.7
reviews the summary of past  findings related to this study. Section 2.8 defines and
formulates the hypothesis of this research, and the chapter ends with a conclusion in
Section 2.9.
2.1 Defining Divestitures
Decisions  to  divest  are  deemed  voluntary  if  they  are  made  by  top  management
representatives  or  company  executives.  Involuntary  divestures  usually  occur  when
invoked  by  third  parties  or  government  regulations.  An  excellent  example  of  when
government regulations led to divestment was in Nigeria’s banking industry in 2010.
Prior  to  new  regulations,  Nigerian  banks  operated  a  boutique  of  financial  services
including: insurance, stockbroking, pension funds, et cetera. In 2011 it was uncovered
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that  most  banks were making losses from the  core  business of  banking,  but  these
losses were either not reported or they were underreported. In a pro-active decision to
prevent the collapse of these banks, the Central Bank of Nigeria scrapped the Universal
Banking Licenses of the banks. This decision compelled the banks to divest from non-
core banking business of insurance, stockbroking, etc. The external factors may be due
to some systemic factors or happenings in the local  economy. The government will
usually step in to avert a major economic disaster if the effect is likely to be systemic.
The divestiture is voluntary if it is a management decision without any outside force or
pressure. Voluntary divestiture usually happens to achieve some strategic objectives by
top management. This research will focus on voluntary divestiture.
According to Lea (2009:8), the word divestiture has two meanings that should not be
confused.  The first  and broadest  type of divestment is when a company sells off  a
business unit, division or assets to one or more acquirers or a third party. In the United
States, the term divestiture is used in reference to when a company is forced to give up
its subsidiary, specific assets or capital. When this happens, it is usually referred to as
involuntary divestment. The focus and concentration of this thesis will be on voluntary
divestitures. Therefore, the word divestiture in this study refers to the voluntarily type
initiated by a firm’s management. The legal meaning as used in the United States is out
of context and will not be considered for the purpose of this research.
2.2 Historical Trends
Erika  (2014)  asserted  that  in  the  1960s,  there  were  few  studies  on  divestitures
compared to those on mergers and acquisitions. During this period, companies were
mainly  focusing on expansion as it  was during the period of  industrial  revolution in
Europe and America. Divestitures were used as a strategy by companies seeking to
increase  the  stock  price  of  the  companies  they  were  acquiring.  During  the  1974
recession, there was a change in strategy by these companies. There was generally a
weak economic demand which subsequently affected the sales of their products, for this
reason, companies had to sell off these ‘divisions to raise funds and improve cash flow’
(Erika,  2014,  p.  140).  After  the  crisis  of  weak  economic  demand,  the  number  of
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divestitures  went  down  and  they  remained  low  until  the  1990s.  The  number  of
divestitures  rose  again  just  after  this  time,  “as  downsizing  and  refocusing  became
prominent business strategies” (Erika, 2014, p. 140). This made them profitable and
efficient.  Since the early 2000s many academic studies similar to the subject under
study were published.
 
2.3 Forms of Divestitures
This study will explain four major types of divestitures: tracking stocks, spin-offs, equity
carve-outs, and sell-offs, but with a major focus on spin-offs and sell-offs transactions,
which happen to be the most widely used in the corporate world.
According to Erika (2014), tracking stocks are also known as letter or targeted stocks.
They are  stocks  that  track  the earnings of  a  division or  subsidiary. They were  first
created in  1984 by  General  Motors  to  track  the  performance of  its  Electronic  Data
System Division. The next tracking stock was created in 1991 by USX Corp. (Billet and
Anand, 2001).  It  is  a situation where a company creates new shares from the non-
taxable stock dividend to its present shareholders. Generally, this leads to the creation
of two stocks: the old stock called the general division stock and the new stock which is
now referred to as the tracking stock.
In comparison to a spin-off, which is a focus area in this research, the company is still
under one legal entity. For the spin-off, the company is divided into two divisions with
clear autonomy. In simple terms, under tracking stock, there is one company with two
stocks, one stock is tracking the other whereas under spin-off, there are two companies
with two distinct stocks. Tracking stocks are more similar to spin-off transactions than
sell-off transactions. 
Gaughan (2011) defined equity carve-outs as the sales of an equity interest in a division
to  a  third  party  or  outsiders.  In  comparison  to  a  spin-off  transaction,  a  new  legal
company  is  established.  When  compared  to  spin-offs  transactions,  the  divested
company has a different management team and is run as a different firm. They are now
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autonomous  and  independent.  According  to  Erika  (2014),  spin-offs  and  sell-offs
transactions have two significant differences. Just like a spin-off transactions, “an equity
carve-out comes with a cash inflow from the buyers, and therefore it is not a tax-free
transaction”  (Erika,  2014,  p.  138).  Secondly, the decisions of  the new management
team are taken by the parent company's board since it is a partial sale as the parent
company still  keeps the majority  of  the shares.  Equity  carve-outs present situations
whereby the parent company does not want to allow an outsider or non-shareholder to
take control of or manage the asset or unit. The parent company still wants to retain
control of strategic decisions in the organization. (Koller, et al., 2005).
An equity carve-out happens when a full  or partial interest in a subsidiary or unit or
asset is sold to non-shareholders or a third party. (Weston, et al., 2004). In an equity
carve-out, the majority shares in the unit are held by the parent company (Derya, 2008).
An equity carve-out can be defined as an initial public offering of a company's subsidiary
or split off from initial public offerings. This kind of organizational structure creates a
new, and  publicly  listed  company  with  partial  or  full  independence  from the  parent
company. (Weston, et al., 2004).
Spin-offs transactions, according to Weston, et al., (2004) can be seen as a dividend to
the shareholders of the parent company. The dividend in this case is referred to as stock
dividend and not the usual cash dividend. A spin-off transaction is defined as a pro-rata
allotment of shares in a subsidiary or unit or asset to the existing shareholders of the
parent's company. This kind of organizational structure creates a new and publicly listed
company with partial  or full  independence from the parent company.  They are fully
autonomous. The parent company maintains majority interest in both equity carve-out
and spin-offs transactions (Derya, 2008). The parent company will not receive any cash
in this type of divestiture, unlike sell-offs where the parent company will receive some
cash payment or consideration. (Weston, et al., 2004).
According to Alexandros and Karen (2015),  in a spin-off transaction, certain assets,
which can be in the form of a unit, division or subsidiary of a firm, are separated from
the parent  company into  a  different  listed  traded company. A new company will  be
created  and  shares  of  this  new  independent  company  are  allotted  to  the  present
shareholders of the parent firm on a pro-rata basis, i.e. on the basis of their present
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holdings  in  the  parent  company.  In  a  spin-off  transaction,  there  are  no  tax
consequences for the parent companies because this transaction is treated as a stock
dividend  to  the  parent  company  shareholders.  However,  in  a  sell-off  transaction,  a
specific asset of the parent firm is sold off for cash or security to another company.
Here, the sale proceeds are taxable, as they are mostly cash payments.
Cusatis  et  al.,  (2001)  defined  sell-offs  transactions  (also  known  as  buy-outs)  as  a
strategy in which the division is sold entirely to another company, usually to a competitor
or even to a new company seeking to gain market share of the industry or a foreign
company trying to gain some market share in a local economy. A sell-offs transaction is
similar to an equity carve-out because they both generate cash inflow to the parent firm.
In this transaction, the parent company gets cash payment in return. They however
differ in that, the new company is now fully autonomous and independent (Erika, 2014).
2.4 Reasons for Divestitures
A company's strategy is a significant driver behind the decision to divest. One primary
reason for this strategy could be that the divested business asset no longer resonates
with  the  parent  company’s  goals  and  objectives.  A good  example  of  this  strategic
alignment  is  when  a  bank  that  offers  a  boutique  of  financial  services  such  as
stockbroking,  pension  funds  and  investment  management,  decides  for  a  strategic
reason to divest from these businesses and focus on the core business of banking.
According  to  Lea  (2009),  a  company  may  divest  to  combine  synergies  between
business divisions to explore economies of scales. This type of strategy can also be
done to spread the operational risk thereby creating highly diversified companies which
are  known  as  conglomerates.  Conglomerates  are  a  combination  of  diversified
companies,  usually  under  the  same management.  A company might  have  acquired
another company to take advantage of the market situation, even though they operate
in different industries. This same company after some years may decide to divest the
acquired company and focus on its core business, especially if the acquired company is
making a loss or draining the cash flow of the parent company.
Another reason according to Lea (2009), is when the asset or business division is more
strategic to another company and this company is willing to pay a premium cost to
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acquire  the  assets  or  the  division  which  is  no  longer  profitable.  For  example,  a
pharmaceutical store is likely to be more strategic to a hospital than it is for a retail
outlet.  The  logic  here  is  merely  “to  sell  high  because  reluctance  to  sell  in  these
situations could result in a hostile takeover” (Lea, 2009, p.29).
2.5 Spin-offs versus Sell-offs
Alexandros and Karen (2012) found that the decision to either spin-off or sell-off is likely
to  be  determined  by  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  firm  and  the  market  value  before
divestiture announcement. For a firm that is overvalued, they are more likely to sell-off
and receive cash payment. For an undervalued firm, they are more likely to spin off in
order to unlock its intrinsic value at a future time. Their empirical findings indicated that
firms which have a higher or lower market value are more likely to spin off or sell off
respectively. An overvalued firm is likely to sell off its assets while an undervalued firm is
more likely to spin off its assets or units.
They also analysed the differences in the "post-divestiture operating and stock return
performance" (Alexandros and Karen,2012, p.4). Their results supported the following
hypotheses: results showed that sell-off transactions produce more substantial gains in
the long run. "The improvements in their long-term post-divestiture operating and stock
return performance are higher for sell-offs transactions when compared to the firms
which divest their assets through a spin-off" (Alexandros and Karen,2012, p.4). Sell-offs
transactions  as  a  form  of  divestiture  show  a  better  result  in  the  long  term  when
compared to spin-offs transactions.
They also looked at the role which organization tax rates played in deciding whether to
sell  off  or  spin  off  assets.  Their  empirical  findings  indicated  "that  firms  with  higher
marginal tax rates are more likely to spin off their assets and firms with lower marginal
tax rates are more likely to sell off their assets" (Alexandros and Karen, 2012, p.5). The
reason for this is that sell-off transactions involve cash payment which is taxable. A spin-
off transaction does not involve any cash payment; it is a stock dividend and therefore
not taxable. A company with a higher tax rate will lose some money in the form of tax
payment. It is therefore strategic to spin-off the asset in order to avoid any tax payment.
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They concluded that the choice between spin-offs and sell-offs transactions is "driven by
several  factors  such as  the  characteristics  of  divesting  firms (pre-divestiture  market
valuation and marginal tax rates), the characteristics of assets being divested (how well
they  perform),  and  by  the  prevailing  market  conditions  at  the  time  of  divestiture"
(Alexandros and Karen,2012,  p.6).  The company’s most  significant  task  is  deciding
whether to sell off its assets or units for long term growth or to spin-off its assets or units
and save big in the form of tax avoidance. 
2.6 Market Efficiency Hypothesis
Market efficiency is a term used to describe a situation where all available information is
reflected  in  the  share  prices.  Efficient  Market  Hypothesis  (EMH) was developed by
Fama. According to EMH, a market is efficient if stock prices fully reflect all available
information about the stock (Fama et al., 1969). “A critical assumption of the EMH is
that, the markets are sufficiently efficient to react to any new information or events that
have an impact on the future profits of the affected companies” (Mthabisi, 2017, p.18).
For example, the stock prices will reflect the decision of a company to design or roll-out
products that will solve a well-known problem in the market place. According to Fama at
al., (1969), there are three forms of market efficiency and they can be classified as:
weak,  semi-strong  or  strong.  The  weak  form describes  a  situation  where  historical
prices of  the shares contain already known information about the stock.  The ‘semi-
strong form describes a situation whereby all  available  public  information about  the
stock is already incorporated in the stock prices. The information is public knowledge
about the company or stock. Information such as the company entering an expanding
market is already reflected in the share price. The weak and semi-strong types only
incorporate public information into the stock prices. The strong form of market efficiency
incorporates not only the public information but also private information not yet known to
the public. The ‘strong form' therefore incorporates all publicly and privately available
information in the share price.  
In an efficient market, the stock prices of shares already reflect both public and private
information about the company. The prices of these shares are premised both on events
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that have taken place in the past, as well as future events (Fama et al., 1969). In an
efficient  financial  market,  as  suggested  by  the  Efficient  Market  Hypothesis  (EMH),
divestitures announcement is immediately incorporated into the stock prices. For this
study,  the  announcement  of  divestitures  will  be  incorporated  or  reflected  into  the
company stock prices. This will make it impossible for any market participants to earn
abnormal returns around the announcement period.
2.7 Spin-offs and Sell-offs Announcement Studies
According  to  Bhana  (2004),  there  is  scant  research  on  the  subject  of  voluntary
divestiture  and  their  impact  in  South  Africa.  South  African  companies  were  majorly
family owned before now, and as a result families are usually not willing to lose control
of  their  businesses  by  way  of  either  "selling  off"  or  "spinning  off."  These  family
businesses are not known to voluntarily divest either through sell-offs transactions or
spin-offs transactions (Bhana, 2004). The reason for this is mostly historical. 
Erika  (2014)  established  that  there  is  a  “considerable  discussion  on  corporate
expansion  in  the  form  of  mergers  and  acquisitions  (M&As)  in  academic  finance
literature”  (Erika,  2014,  p.136).  According  to  Erika  (2014)  writings  on  organization
"downsizing" are not as popular, maybe because splitting up is usually perceived as a
failure.  The  simple  reason  is  that  many  market  participants  see  mergers  and
acquisitions from a positive perspective. Sell-off and spin-off transactions are perceived
negatively as people generally think that "adding up" will always be better or that it will
produce a better result than "subtracting from."  However, this is not to imply that there
are few studies that focus on the different forms of divesting an organization and the
subsequent results incurred from such strategies. It is fascinating to note that many of
these articles and papers were written in the 1990s. The 1990s was the period in which
divestitures became very popular and wide-spread (Erika, 2014).
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Erika (2014) did a study to find out when spinoff will be a good strategy to undertake in
the Airline Industry in the United States. He conducted three case studies of spin-offs in
the Airline industry. In each case, the “parent firm and subsidiary had different Standard
Industry Classification (SIC) Codes” (Erika, 2014, p.149). The SIC codes is a case of
Cross-Industry situation. The three cases did not provide positive results as suggested
by  academic  literature.  The findings thereof,  were  as  a  result  of  the  robustness of
agreements  signed between parent  companies and their  subsidiaries,  as per  future
relationships. The three cases are between Expedia and TripAdvisor, which had future
relationships. They produced a positive abnormal return. In the case of Air Canada and
Aero plan, there was a previous and substantial agreement as per future relationship. In
the last case, America Airline and Sabre had no robust substantial agreement has per
future transactions. They produced a negative abnormal return. He concluded that spin-
offs transactions are a good strategy, only if the goals and objectives of the spun-off
division are different from that of the parent company. The parent company and that of
the new divested company must have different goals and objectives in order for the
strategy to add any value. Erika (2004) also found that higher returns are achieved
when the parent company and its subsidiary operate in entirely different industries. The
result  shows that  if  the parent  company and the divested unit  operate in  the same
industry spin-offs transactions will add no value to the parent company. 
According to Donghun and Ravi (2010), there have been numerous empirical studies to
examine  the  relationship  between  corporate  divestiture  and  subsequent  firm
performance in both developed and developing markets. However, inconsistent findings
persist  among  these  studies.  They  conducted  a  meta-analysis  of  the  divestiture-
performance relationship. They used 650 effect sizes from 94 reviews and found that,
among  these  studies,  corporate  divestiture  had  a  positive  impact  on  company
performance. In order to further substantiate their claim of a positive impact, there is
need for further research, hence the need for the present study.  
Lea (2009)  examined a sample of Danish sell-offs transactions undertaken from 2002
until  April  2009.  Results  showed  an  average  abnormal  return  on  the  day  of  the
announcement of 1.29%, but the effect was not statistically significant. The component
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of the abnormal return generated by his findings is in line with several similar event
studies on the sell-off transactions carried out on samples of American sell-offs. The
result however, showed a negative cumulative average abnormal return of -1.96% after
the announcement.  This indicates that the positive effect on the announcement day
disappeared during the 30 days after the announcement. He concluded that Danish sell-
offs add marginal value to shareholders wealth on the day of the announcement, but
that this value tends to vanish in the period post the announcement. The conclusion
here, for Danish Companies, is a situation where we have shareholders benefitting only
in the short term. The long-term value added is negative for shareholders.  
Francis et al.,  (2005) discussed the different forms of corporate divestitures and the
reasons for these corporate actions. They used some samples of corporate divestitures
to identify the primary motivations in the Singapore context. For Singapore companies,
operational efficiency, increase profitability and liquidity are the three major reasons for
embarking on divestitures. They used price data around the announcement dates and
they  proved  that  returns  on  the  parent  company  increased  significantly  following
divestiture announcements. They concluded that corporate divestiture adds value for
Singapore companies.
Sebastian (2014) looked at the wealth effects of 90 completed spin-offs transactions in
the United Kingdom that were announced on the stock exchange from January 1987 up
to December 2010. The study also investigated if the certain factors had any wealth
effects by means of adding value to parent companies. These factors included: change
in corporate focus, level of information asymmetry, the relative size, board monitoring
effectiveness, and takeover interest. Results showed that, the announcement of spin-
offs leads to a significantly positive wealth effect of 4.46% over the three-day window.
The result was analyzed in different panels. Panel A was on corporate focus. The mean
CAR for 50 companies with an increase in corporate focus was 5.24% while the mean
CAR for 40 companies with decreased corporate focus was 3.49%. Panel B was on
takeover interest. The mean CAR with takeover interest was -5.37%, but a company
with no takeover interest  had a mean CAR of 2.29%. Panel  C was on the level  of
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Information Asymmetry. There was a higher mean CAR for a company with a higher
level of information asymmetry when compared with a company with a lower level of
information asymmetry. Panel D was on Board monitoring effectiveness as measured by
board size.
Firms with higher board monitoring effectiveness had a positive mean CAR of 2.63%
while companies with a lower board of director’s oversight functions and monitoring
effectiveness report non-significant negative mean CAR. Panel E was on the size of the
Spin-offs. A relatively large size produced a higher CAR of 7.74% while a small size
spin-off only produced a CAR of 1.19%. There was, however, no evidence for long-term
wealth  effects  associated  with  a  spin-off,  as  the  results  are  mostly  insignificant.
According to him, companies with no takeover interests that are submitted before the
spin-off  announcement  brought  a  significantly  higher  return  in  comparison  to  those
where such interest was present (Sebastian, 2014).
Md Hamid (2010) studied the value effect of 25 corporate spin-off events that occurred
in Singapore between 1975 and 2005. Results showed that parent shareholders gain
about  15.73  percent  value  after  spin-offs  transactions.  The  15.73% are  derived  as
follows: the spin-off stocks gained 6.62% while the balance of 9.11% gain came from
the  parent  stocks.  Findings  from  the  study  corresponded  with  the  suggestion  that
corporate  spin-offs  add value  to  shareholders’  wealth.  There  was another  shocking
revelation from his result. There is a correlation between debt-asset ratio of the parent
company  and  the  value  derived  from  its  spin-off  transactions.  He  concluded  that
corporate spin-offs has a positive impact in the Singapore market as was found earlier
in the developed markets.
Francis et al. (2005) supported the findings of Md Hamid (2010) in Singapore. Their
paper  discussed  the  different  forms  of  corporate  divestitures,  the  reasons  for  this
corporate activity and the empirical findings of their economic outcomes. The result of
their findings shows that divestiture announcements have a positive impact on the share
returns of the parent company. They discovered two factors that were responsible for
these positive abnormal returns. First was the size of the divestitures and with second
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being, accounting gains. Overall, they concluded that corporate divestiture add value for
Singapore companies.
Emily et  al.,  (2014) did a study on the impact of divestitures (spin-offs and sell-offs
transactions)  on  shareholder  wealth  for  the  parent  companies  listed  on  the
Johannesburg  Stock  Exchange (JSE)  over  the  period  1995-2011.  The focus of  this
study was on long term value creation. The event window used for this study was 250
days pre and post and 500 days pre and post for a total of 44 sample sizes. The study
also made a comparison between the gains from spin-offs transactions and sells offs
transactions. They found significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns over the
250 and 500 days respectively, after the announcement date. On the 44 samples of
companies,  they  had  a  CAAR  of  -0.89%  and  -1.27%  for  pre  and  post  250  days
respectively  while  the  CAAR  for  pre  and  post  500  days  was  -0.65%  and  -1.0%
respectively. They further looked at the value creation for spin-offs and sell-offs. For sell-
offs, they had a CAAR of -0.43% and 0.37% for post 250 days and 500 days. Spin-offs
showed a CAAR of -0.84% and -0.64% for post 250 days and 500 days.
The results show that divestitures in South Africa destroy shareholder value in the long
run.  Divestitures,  whether  sell-offs  transactions  or  spin-offs  transactions  do  have  a
negative impact on the share performance of the parent company. Secondly, it is better
to sell off their assets than to spin off the assets. The findings in Emily et al., (2014)
differed from the findings presented by a study of spin-offs transactions in South Africa
by Bhana (2014).  Emily et  al.,  (2014) found a significantly negative CAAR over the
longer term horizons of 250 and 500 days, whereas according to Bhana (2004), spin-
offs  transactions generate  significant  improvements  in  returns.  The two studies  had
conflicting results. Perhaps the main differentiating factor was the time- periods and the
selection criteria.  A quick  look at  some of  the reasons for  this  contradiction  will  be
helpful.
The study by Emily et al., (2014) was conducted just after South Africa’s first democratic
elections in 1994, when Nelson Mandela was elected as the first black President of the
Republic. Bhana (2004) conducted his research when the apartheid government was
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still in place and South Africa was under economic sanctions from western countries.
Emily et al., (2014) used the two-factor APT model suggested by (Van Rensburg 1999)
while Bhana (2014) used the three-factor Fama and French model. Their conclusion
was that divestiture in South Africa destroys shareholder values in the long run. They
discovered a negative CAAR of -1.26% and -1% over the 250 and 500 respectively,
after the announcement date.
Bhana’s study showed that  South  African holding  companies  that  have engaged in
restructuring  through  spin-offs  have  benefitted  by  significant  improvements  in
performance for both the parents and their spin-off companies. They studied voluntary
spin-offs initiated by 19 parent companies on JSE between 1988 through 1999. They
calculated  both  "raw"  or  adjusted  share  returns  and  matched-firm-adjusted  share
returns (MTARs) over the various intervals from 24 months before the spin-offs through
36 months after the spin-offs. The companies experienced an average return of about
31.6% in excess return for the two years before the ex-date. For the post period of 6
months, 12 months, 24 months and 36 months, the mean raw returns were: 11.8%,
21.6%, 48.2% and 59.3% respectively, while the MTARs were 6.9%, 13.8%, 27.6% and
20.5%  for  6  months,  12  months,  24  months  and  36  months,  respectively.  They
concluded that it  is better for  the parent companies to divest and be spun-off to its
shareholders.  Therefore,  he  recommended  that  South  African  holding  companies
should engage more actively in divesting their subsidiaries through spin-offs (Bhana,
2004).
A fascinating study by Hite and Owers (1983) shows positive abnormal returns. For their
study, they  considered  116  companies  involved  in  spin-offs  transactions  during  the
period of 1963 to 1981. They examined press announcements showing the reasons for
the  spin-off.  "The  authors  classified  their  sample  in  four  groups:  specialization  in
operations, facilitation of a merger, legal/regulatory difficulties and unknown reasons"
(Erika, 2014, p.142). Their result showed that share price reactions on the first press
announcement  around  the  two-day  interval  showed  no  real  differences  and  were
significantly positive for all four categories of spin-offs transactions mentioned above.
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Analyzing the results of the four groups, they found out the following: a positive returns
of 14.5% for companies that their operations were specialized; 11.6% for firms who
facilitate  mergers;  a  negative  returns  of  –4.7% for  companies  in  the  third  category
whose  spin-offs  transactions  are  a  response  to  regulatory  or  potential  anti-trust
intervention,  finally  a  return  of  6.6%  for  the  group  of  firms  with  unknown  spin-off
transactions.  The 6.6% return is  approximately  equal  to  the mean of  the first  three
groups discussed above. (Hite and Owers, 1983). 
Veld  &Veld-Merkoulova  (2004)  conducted  a  similar  study  in  15  different  European
countries. They looked at 156 spin-offs transactions. Their results showed an abnormal
positive cumulative average return of 2.62% over the three-day announcement window.
This then increased to 2.66% for the subsequently completed spin-offs transactions.
Cusatis et al. (1993) calculated the stock returns of spin-offs transactions. Specifically,
they looked at both, the parent companies and the spun-off divisions. They used the raw
and matched-firm-adjusted returns  to  analyze both  the  spinoff  and parent  company
performance. For the spinoffs, their parents, and the spinoff-parent combination, they
found positive abnormal returns for the period under consideration.
Erika (2014) found out that the positive impact on the stock price does not happen only
at the time of the spin-off transactions announcement or first trading day but rather there
were also abnormal positive results after this time especially the years after.
Matthias and Markus (2010) examined sources of divestiture gains in the insurance
industry.  Their  study  was  unique  for  comparing  performance  between  programme
divestiture  and  “stand-alone”  divestitures.  They  define  “divestiture  programme  as
groups of (unit) divestitures that adjust the corporate focus of a firm according to an
explicitly announced strategic logic” (Matthias and Markus, 2010, p.85). In a programme
divestiture, an organization embarks on a series of transactions in order to implement
their  corporate  strategy.  For  “stand-alone”  divestitures,  the  organization  uses  one
transaction  to  achieve  its  corporate  strategy.  Using  event  study  methodology,  they
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analyzed  abnormal  returns  of  160  divestiture  announcements  within  the  global
insurance  industry  between  1998  and  2007.  Their  findings  shows  that  programme
divestitures generate higher positive abnormal returns than “stand-alone” divestitures.
Furthermore,  they  looked  at  what  might  been  responsible  for  the  higher  abnormal
returns in  programme divestitures. They considered two factors:  experience transfer
and timing. By experience transfer, they considered if management has been this kind
of divestiture in the past and by timing, they referred to how the divestiture has been
scheduled for effective execution. Looking at these two factors, it was discovered that
experience transfer does not have any impact on the announcement returns. However,
timing of the divestitures did have positive impact on the announcement returns.
Meijui  (2012)  examined  the  performance  of  divestiture  announcements  on  listed
companies  in  Taiwan.  She  considered  two  specific  kinds  of  divestitures:  sell-offs
transactions and equity carve-outs. He analyzed 266 sell-offs transactions and equity
carve-outs  between  1995  and  2004.  She  looked  at  both  short-term  and  long-term
performance. For short-term performance, she measured the abnormal stock returns
while  she used financial  ratios to  measure  the long-term performance.  Her  findings
showed positive abnormal stock returns associated with divestiture announcement for
listed companies in Taiwan.
Jain (1985) examined the effect of voluntary sell-offs announcements on shareholder
wealth in the United States between 1976 and 1978. Past researches have limited the
effect of divestitures on sellers and most importantly companies listed on a recognized
stock exchanges. Jain studied the effects not just on the sellers but also on the buyers.
He  used  a  sample  of  over  1000  voluntary  sell-offs,  specifically  for  first  time
announcements.  His  findings  showed  that  both  sellers  and  buyers  earn  significant
positive  abnormal  returns  from  these  transactions.  However,  the  abnormal  returns
earned by sellers are higher than the abnormal returns earned by buyers. Furthermore,
sell-off announcements are preceded by significant negative returns before the sell-off
activities. 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) did a very interesting study by comparing acquisitions and
divestitures announcements in the United States. They examined 1305 firms from 59
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industries between 1990 and 1999. Their findings on the two form of restructuring i.e.
acquisitions and divestitures in the 1900s increased shareholders wealth. In addition,
their results also showed that 50 percent of the firm are either involved in acquisitions or
one  form of  major  divestitures.  Finally, economic  reasons  was  the  major  driver  for
restructuring during this period. 
Rosenfeld  (1984)  investigated  additional  evidence  on  the  relationship  between
divestiture announcements and shareholders wealth in the United States. Two types of
voluntary  divestitures  announcements  were  considered:  spin-off  and  sell-off
announcements. He found out that both spin-off and sell-off transactions have positive
abnormal returns on divesting firms. In addition, spin-off transactions outperformed sell-
off transactions on the day of the event. 
Most research on corporate divestitures and its impact on shareholders’ wealth have
been conducted mostly for listed companies on a recognized stock exchange. However,
Feldman et  al.,  (2016)  investigated  the  relationship  between  firm’s values  in  family
companies. Since these family companies are mostly not listed on the stock exchange,
they used hand collected data on a sample of over 30,000 family businesses. Their
findings showed that non-family companies are likely to embark on a divestiture than a
family owned companies, especially if the family owned companies are managed by a
family member. Furthermore, it was established that divestitures undertaken by family
companies  generated  higher  post-announcement  returns  when  compared  to
divestitures undertaken by non-family companies. The significance of their study was to
show  that  family  businesses  may  pursue  objectives  beyond  shareholders  wealth
maximization  such  as  “preserving  the  founder’s  legacy  and  heritage,  creating
employment  opportunities  for  family  members,  and maintaining  family  harmony and
social status” ( Feldman et al., 2016, p.2). These multiples objectives may hinder them
to exploit available economic opportunities. 
Desai and Jain (1999), examined if corporate focus was responsible for stock market
gains associated with spin-offs. According to them, corporate focus can take two forms:
selling unrelated assets to others or by spinning off unrelated divisions. They considered
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155 spinoffs between 1975 and 1999. They found out that there was higher long-run
abnormal returns for focus-increasing spin-offs than for non-focus-increasing spinoffs.
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) investigated the effect of voluntary spin-off announcements
on  shareholder  wealth.  Their  findings  was  consistent  with  the  results  of  past
investigation that voluntary spin-off announcements have a positive significant effect on
share prices. In addition, they discovered that the share price increases for large spin-
off transactions is greater than small spin-off transactions i.e. a spin-off transactions of
say $10,000,000.00 will generate a higher share prices than a spin-off transactions of
$2,000,000.00.
Zakaria  and  Arnold  (2012)  examined  value  creation  for  spin-offs  transactions  in
Malaysia.  They  investigated  the  short-and  long-run  share  return  performance  of
Malaysian spin-off firms between 1980 and 2011.Their study examined the performance
of spin-off firms against the benchmarks of Malaysian All-Shares indices. Their findings
showed that  parent  firms significantly  outperformed the market  during the few days
surrounding  the  announcement  date.  For  the  long-run  analysis,  they  considered  a
period of three years. Their findings showed that there was no abnormal returns for
either parents or spun-off entities. 
Ameziane et al., (1996) examined stock market reactions to divestment by financially
distressed  and  healthy  firms  and  also  what  impact  the  reaction  has  on  lender
monitoring. They found excess return for both financially distressed and healthy firms,
but the excess returns were higher for financially distressed firms. These higher returns
were derived from adjustment for reduction in financial distress cost. In addition, there
was significant higher returns for firms with higher level of debt in the United Kingdom.
2.8 Conclusion of Literature Review
Overall,  findings from the  literature  review revealed that,  although there  have been
scores  of  empirical  studies  that  have  been  conducted  on  Spin-offs  and  Sell-offs
transactions, the results have not been consistent among these studies. There is no
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certainty regarding whether divestitures announcements have an impact on the share
performance of the parent companies, hence the reason for this study.
From Sebastian’s 2014 study in  the UK,  there was no evidence of  long-term value
effects associated with a spin-off, as the results were mostly insignificant. Emily et al.,
(2014) collaborated this in their studies and they concluded that divestitures, either spin-
off transactions or sell-off transactions do not have any impact of the share performance
of the parent companies, and as such, destroys shareholder wealth in the long run.
Bhana (2004) on the other hand, found that spin-offs transactions do have an impact on
the share performance of the parent company.
Francis et al. (2005) supported the findings of Md Hamid (2010) in Singapore. There is
positive abnormal returns for divestment in Singapore. The positive abnormal returns
were attributed to two things: the size of the divestitures and the computed accounting
gains. Overall, they concluded that corporate divestiture adds values to shareholder’s
wealth for Singapore companies.
The outcome of this research will add to the body of knowledge on whether divestitures
add  value  to  shareholders  wealth,  especially  in  South  Africa,  considering  the
inconsistency in the result of past findings.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.0 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the research methodology that will be used to analyze the data
and  answer  the  research  questions.  Section  3.1  discusses  the  data,  and  sources.
Section 3.2 outlines the steps for  performing a short  term event  study. Section  3.3
explores the research design. Section 3.4 presents the t-tests under the null hypothesis.
The t-test was computed using the event study metrics software. The chapter ends with
a summary of main points in Section 3.5
3.1 Data and Data Sources
The study focuses on any spin-offs and sell-offs transactions announced by a company
listed on the JSE, with the exceptions of those companies whose shares returns cannot
be extracted from the Bloomberg terminal. The requirement for the transaction value is
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that all spin-offs and sell-offs should have been conducted on JSE. The announcement
of the deals was between and inclusive of the years 2006 to 2016. In total, there were
36 deals of spin-offs transactions completed between the period under study, and 41
deals of sell-offs transactions also completed between these periods. All share returns
were  extracted  from  the  Bloomberg  terminal.  The  period  between  2006  and  2016
accounted for over 80% of spin-offs and sell-offs deals that occurred between 1996 and
2016. The data on the announcement dates, the deal value of Spin-offs and Sell-offs
transactions, parent companies and the subsidiaries, market capitalization (size) were
all extracted from the Bloomberg terminal. Few companies that were subtracted from
the data are the companies whose share returns were not available on the terminal. 
The test period will be divided into estimation and event windows. This is the period of
time under which abnormal returns were computed for the parent companies, for both
spin-off transactions and sell-off transactions. The test period is from 180 days prior to
the  divestitures  announcement  to  30  days  after  the  announcement.  The  estimation
window and the event window are the two components of the test period that were
considered in calculating abnormal returns.
The estimation window refers to the period where the normal returns, the estimates of
the intercept, and the slope parameters for the parent companies are calculated (Jared,
2012). The period will run from 180 days prior to the announcement, to 30 days prior to
the announcement.  The event  window is  the time frame within  which the abnormal
returns,  around the announcement of  the divestitures,  will  be calculated.  The event
window is a short period of 30 days prior to the announcement until 30 days after, in
order to capture the impact of share performance. This short period of 30 days has
been selected to see the real effect of the announcement.  If  a more extended time
period was selected, it  is possible for other events to have happened and therefore
leading to a misleading result. However, additional steps were taken to make sure that
we do not have other confounding events.
The purpose of an event study is to calculate abnormal returns associated with the said
event.  It  is  essential  and  necessary  to  first  calculate  the  normal  returns  before
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calculating any abnormal  returns.  An abnormal  return is  the difference between the
realised returns and the estimated returns. For this research, an abnormal return is the
difference between the realised return of a share and the expected return of that share.
The abnormal return was calculated on a day-to-day basis over the span of the event
window. For example, if  the expected return on an investment is 9% and the actual
return is 6%, the abnormal return is still -3%. Let us look at another scenario; if the
expected return is 11% and the actual return is 15%, then there is a positive abnormal
return of 4%. It is also important to note that the cumulative average abnormal return is
the accumulation of abnormal return over the event window period.
3.2 Steps for performing a short-term event study
In performing a short-term event study, the following eight steps can be adopted in order
to reach a reliable result accurately. 
The very  first  step  was to  define  the  event.  The market  is  very  dynamic  and ever
changing in order to adapt to emerging events in the market place. For a corporate
organization, one will expect multiple events to take place in a particular year. Examples
of corporate events that can happen include: the announcement of dividends, mergers,
and acquisitions, resignations or the death of a powerful CEO, launch of a new product
line, expansion to a foreign market, the introduction of new regulations and many more.
This corporate event must be occurring for the first time and instantaneous information
should be available to the public. If the information is already leaked to the public, then it
is likely not to see any reaction to asset prices. For the purpose of this research, the
corporate event has been defined as divestiture with a focus on Spin-off and Sell-off
transactions only.
The second step was the definition of the sample size and the countries with the stock
exchange to be examined. In general, it is appropriate to choose a substantial sample
period  to  be  able  to  collect  as  many  events  as  possible.  This  study  considered
divestitures that happened on the JSE in South Africa between the year 2006 and 2016.
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The third process was the determination of the event date. The event date in the study
refers to  the date on which the event  occurred.  A typical  corporate event  will  have
multiple dates. There can only be one event date, therefore a specific date must be
selected. The event date can be the date on which the deal was announced, when it
was filed at the regulatory authorities, the date the deal was completed or even the date
when payment was made. In this instance, the announcement date denotes the event
date. This announcement date is also available on Bloomberg.
It  is  essential  to  drop  confounding  events.  Confounding  events  are  events  that
happened simultaneously during the course of the year. It is possible to announce a
dividend cut because the organization is entering a new market. There are two events
here: dividend cut and expansion to a new market. A CEO may resign as a result of a
false  allegation  against  him.  The  resignation  of  a  CEO  is  one  event  while  fraud
allegation  is  another  event.  These  confounding  events  must  be  separated,  and  a
decision has to be made as to which event will be tested as explained in the first step.
The fourth step was to identify the estimation method for the expected or normal return
calculation.  In  order to  determine the abnormal  returns,  i.e.  the returns that  can be
attributed  to  the  event  of  interest,  the  expected  return  for  the  event  date  must  be
calculated. The expected or normal return is the return the company would have earned
if the said event had not happened, in simple terms, what would have happened had the
CEO not resigned, or if there was no announcement of any divestiture. Abnormal return
is the difference between the actual return and the expected return. There are several
methods to calculate abnormal return, but one thing they have in common is that they
all use historical prices. Any of the following return models can be used: Constant Mean
Return,  Market  Return,  Arbitrage  Pricing  Model  (APT)  Capital  Asset  pricing  model
(CAPM),  French  and  Fama  three  and  four-factor  model  and  the  Matched  Firms
(Portfolio) model. The return model to be used must be the one that best explains the
peculiarity of  the countries and the market.  Some return models are best used in a
developed market  while  others are best  for  undeveloped or  emerging markets.  The
formula below can be used to calculate the expected or normal returns:
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Rit=
Pit−Pi (t−1)
Pi (t−1)
Where:  Rit  is the return over the period t for asset i ,  Pit  and  Pi(t−1)  represent the
prices for asset i   over period t  and (t−1)  respectively. (Mthabisi, 2017, p.24).
For the purpose of this study, the two-factor Asset Pricing (APT) model suggested by
Van Rensburg (2001)  was adopted.  This  model  was adopted because of  the many
cross-sectional  irregularities  found  on  the  JSE  (Rensburg  and  Slaney  1997).  The
benchmark return portfolio is represented by:
Rit−R ft=αf +β fFINDI (RFINDIt−R ft )+β fRESI (RRESIt−R ft )+εft
Where: Rit  is the return on company I  in period t, Rft  is the risk-free in period t
proxied by the 91-day South African Treasury Bill,  RFINDIt  is the return on the JSE
Financial-Industrial Index, RRESIt  is the return on the JSE Resources Index, β fFINDI
and  β fRESI  are the risk parameters to be estimated and  ε ft  is the residual error
term. (Emily et al., 2014, p.573).
Once the appropriate model  has been adopted,  the fifth  step was to  determine the
estimation window and event window for the said event. The estimation window is the
period  of  days,  usually  before  and  after  the  event  day, denoted by  day 0  used  to
determine the expected return for an asset or shares. Abnormal returns were calculated
using the event window while the expected return was calculated using the estimation
window. An estimation window of  180 days and an event  window of  30 days were
chosen since the focus of the research was on the short term effect. The event date is
usually denoted by day 0.
The sixth process involved the determination of the cumulative average abnormal return
(CAAR). Before then, we have to calculate the firm's abnormal average return (AAR) for
each respective event and each day in the event window. The CAAR is the sum of a 
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firm's abnormal returns over a specified period, prior to or after an event. The AAR, as 
well as the CAAR, can either be positive or negative. The result is dependent on how 
the market reacts to the news of the said event. The summation of the average 
abnormal return over the T days in the event window, over all times t will form the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) as in the equation below:
CAARt=CAARt+AARt                                               (Mthabisi, 2017, p.26).
The seventh step was to test whether the AAR and CAAR are significantly different from
zero. There are many test statistics that can be applied to do this. The result will either
be  statistically  significant  or  statistically  insignificant  thereby  determining  if  the  null
hypothesis will be accepted or rejected.
Event study software purchased from the Department of Tax and Finance was used to
calculate the AAR and CAAR. In order  to use this software,  three sets of  data are
required. The first is called the Event list. The event list consists of three columns. The
first  column  contains  the  IDs  of  the  companies  as  extracted  from  the  Bloomberg
terminal. These are usually represented by three letters word. E.g., Tiger Brand share
returns was represented by TBS. The second column contains the firm names. The third
or  last  column  contain  the  event  dates.  The  event  dates  in  this  research  are  the
announcement dates. The second set of data used is called the dataset. This contains
two columns.  The first  column contains  the  timeline  i.e.,  the  daily  share  returns as
extracted from Bloomberg terminal. The second contains the share returns. The third
sets of data is called the return model.  The APT two-factor return model was used.
These three sets  of  data  were  then imported  into  the  software  to  generate results.
These returns are analyzed in details in chapter four. 
3.3 Research Design
The event study methodology was applied. An event study is carried out to determine
what impact a particular event has on a company's share price. The said event can be
the announcement of a new product, entering a new market, a breakthrough in research
and development, mergers and acquisitions or the resignation of a CEO. For this study,
45
the said events will be spin-offs and sell-offs on the JSE between 2006 and 2016. It
examined the abnormal returns to shareholders and whether or not additional value was
added to shareholders’ wealth. As indicated earlier, the event study has one major flaw,
i.e.  susceptibility  to confounding events.  There is a high possibility  of  having two or
more significant events occurring at the same.
In  order  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  divestitures  announcement  created  any
abnormal returns, we have to first calculate the normal returns expected without this
announcement. In this study, daily stock returns were used, and these stock prices were
collected for two years before the announcement period and two years after.
The study then analyzed if stock prices show abnormal returns during the event window.
Abnormal returns are returns in excess of expected returns after adjusting for risk. The
event is the announcement of divestitures by South African companies listed on the
JSE. The event window period for this study is 61 days (-30, 0, +30). Day 0 will be used
to denote the announcement day.
The daily abnormal returns can be calculated using an equilibrium asset pricing model 
such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), the market model, net-of-market return and matched firm portfolio (Fama 
1969).
In  order  to  calculate  the  abnormal  returns  after  the  divestiture  announcement,  this
research will use the two-factor Asset Pricing (APT) model suggested by Van Rensburg
(2001). Besides, “this model was chosen over the three factors of Fama and French
model because JSE does not have the size capabilities to construct effective ten stock
benchmarks for the Small minus Big size portfolio, and the high minus low book-to-
market Value portfolio for each subsector" (Emily et al., 2014, p.570). In order, to get the
abnormal returns, actual returns will be deducted from the expected or normal returns.
Finally, the average abnormal returns over the number of days in the event window will
be added together to calculate the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). 
The  cumulative  average  abnormal  return  (CAAR) and  the  average  abnormal  return
(AAR)  are  both  useful  in  calculating  the  abnormal  returns  in  an  event  study.  The
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researcher examined the results for AAR and CAAR for each company and used the t-
test to determine the significance of the data that was analysed.
3.4 Test Statistics under the Null Hypothesis 
T-tests will be used to measure the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, as
explained above. The mean or average of one or two normally distributed populations of
a hypothesis is called the t-test. The t-test together with the CAAR and p-values was
computed using the newly acquired event study metrics software by the Department of
Finance and Tax, University of Cape Town.
3.5     Formulation of Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1:
The null hypothesis states that the announcement of spin-offs and sell-offs transactions
do not yield abnormal returns in the share price of the parent companies. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns measure the value, therefore implying that sell-
offs and spin-offs announcements yield abnormal returns (CAAR = 0). 
The alternative hypothesis states that the announcement of spin-offs and sell-offs yield
abnormal returns in share prices of the parent companies.
Hypothesis 2:
The null hypothesis states that for the pre-sell offs and spin-offs announcement period,
the cumulative average abnormal return for parent companies before announcement
should not be higher than the cumulative average abnormal return for parent companies
post announcement.
47
The alternative hypothesis states that for  the pre-sell-offs and spin-offs transactions’
announcement period, the cumulative average abnormal return for parent companies
before announcement should be higher than the cumulative average abnormal returns
for parent companies after the announcement.
Hypothesis 3:
The  null  hypothesis  states  that  the  cumulative  average  abnormal  return  of  parent
companies is not higher for spin-offs than sell-offs transactions.
The alternative hypothesis states that the cumulative average abnormal return of parent
companies is higher for spin-offs than sell-offs.
3.6 Summary 
This chapter described the methodological approach that was applied in analyzing the
effects of Spin-offs and Sell-offs transactions announcements to the shareholders of the
parent companies. The first section of the chapter outlined the data and data sources,
followed by an indication of the processes or steps followed when performing a short-
term event study. Thereafter a thorough explanation of the research design was given.
To determine the effect of the announcements, abnormal returns were calculated and
analysed. 
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CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
4.0 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of  the findings of this study. These were obtained
using the methodology explained in Chapter 3. A detailed explanation will be discussed
in this chapter. An event study approach was used. The abnormal returns (AR), average
abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) results are
presented. In Chapter 2, it was indicated that the study only considered spin-off and
sell-off types of divestiture and their impact on the share performance of the parent
company. As such, the findings of this study will  be divided into two, in line with the
research objective. The results from spin-offs will be discussed first, before the sell-off
results.
This section addresses the first null hypothesis which states that the announcements of
divestitures do not affect the share prices of the parent companies, therefore CAAR = 0
around announcement dates. Section 4.2 summarizes data for the spin-off results while
section 4.3 indicates the result for AAR for spin-off transactions. Section 4.4 addresses
the  CAAR  for  spin-off  transactions.  Section  4.5  introduces  the  result  of  sell-off
transactions. Section 4.6 presents the result for AAR for sell-off transactions. Section
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4.7  addresses  the  CAAR  for  sell-off  transactions.  It  also  addresses  the  second
hypothesis  which  states  that  the  difference  between  pre-announcement  CAAR  is
greater than post-announcement CAAR. It is worth noting that different event windows
of;  +  3 days, + 5 days, +10 days, + 15 days, +20 days, +25 days and +30 days were
tested.  Section  4.8  presents  test  results  for  the  null  hypothesis  stating  that  the
cumulative average abnormal returns for spin-off transactions effects are higher than in
sell-off transactions.
4.1   Analysis of Spin-Off Results
A total of 36 companies were analyzed for the spin-off transactions effect. The daily
share returns were extracted from Bloomberg terminal for the ten year period between
2006 and 2016. In order to have better representation, all companies within this period
were  considered,  with  the  exception  of  companies  whose  share  returns  were  not
available.  The  event  study  metrics  software  was  used  to  generate  the  results  as
explained in chapter 3. The event list, dataset and return model were imported into the
software to generate the results analysed below.
4.2  Average Abnormal Returns for spin-off announcement
The sample of the study for spin-off consisted of 36 JSE listed companies for deals
announced and concluded from 2006 to 2016. Detailed results of the AAR for all the
event windows can be found in table 1. 
Table. 1, shows the AAR over the event window for the period over 61 days (-30, 0,
+30). Day 0 will be the announcement date. 
Day 0, which is the day of announcement showed the highest AAR of 1.19%. The AAR
for subsequent days, up to the 6th days all showed a negative AAR. From the table, we
can see that the pre-event windows for the following days are all negative: day 1, 3, 4,
6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28 and 29 while day 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17,
19, 24, 25, 26, and 30 showed a positive AAR. For the post-event period, day 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 30 produced a negative AAR while the following
post-event days produced a positive AAR: day 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
23, 24 and 29.
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The pre-event window of 30 days produced a negative AAR of -0.28% with an average
of – 0.0093% while the post-event window of 30 days produced a marginal positive of
0.09% with an average of 0.003%.
Table 1: Sample Daily Statistics of AAR for Spin-off announcements.
Full Sample AAR
Mean 0.2654%
Medium 0.0309%
Standard Deviation 0.09613%
Minimum -0.7938%
Maximum 1.1985%
T-test 2.7605
p-value 0.0038
The mean, medium and standard deviation were calculated over the event window. The
mean AAR is 0.2654%, maximum AAR 1.1985% and the minimum AAR -0.7938%. The
sample  mean  is  close  to  zero.  This  implies  that  most  companies  have  average
abnormal returns marginally above zero. The standard deviation is 0.09613%. 
With a test statistic of 2.7605 and p-value of 0.0038, the null hypothesis will be rejected
at a 5% level of significance since the p-value of 0.0038 is less than 0.05. It therefore
means that spin-off transactions generate abnormal returns.
4.3   Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for spin-off announcement
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Cumulative average abnormal returns were analysed and computed using the AARs
and the results are presented in table 3 and shown graphically in figure 1 below.
The post-announcement CAAR showed a positive impact for most of the days except
for day 9,10,11,16 and 17 which are all negative. Specifically, day 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 all produced a
positive post-announcement CAAR. Over the 30 days window period, the CAAR was
22.24% with an average of 0.74%. This result clearly shows that spin-off transactions
have a positive impact on the share price of the parent company. 
The pre-announcement CAAR showed a negative impact for most of the days except
for  day  13,  14,  15  and  30  which  all  produced  positive  pre-announcement  CAAR.
Specifically, day 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26,  27,  28  and 29 produced negative  pre-announcement  CAAR.  Over  the  30 days
window period, the CAAR was -7.11% with an average of -0.24%.
The  difference  between  pre  and  post-announcement  cumulative  average  abnormal
returns is shown below:
Pre-CAAR = -7.11%
Post-CAAR = 22.24%
Difference = 15.13% 
The results show that there is a difference of 15.13%, which is greater than zero. With a
difference of 15.13%, the result  is  significant enough to draw a conclusion from the
hypothesis.  The  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  as  the  difference  between  the  pre-
announcement CAAR, and post-announcement CAAR is greater than 0. T-tests were
also computed to test the significance of the difference in the means of pre and post-
announcement CAARs.
This result  contradicts  Emily et  al.,  (2014) findings that spin-off  transactions destroy
shareholders’  wealth.  In  conclusion,  spin-off  transactions  destroyed  shareholders’
wealth both in the long term but adding value in the short term.
Table 2:  Daily T-test results for the parent firms for Sell-off transactions.
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Date CAAR t-stat P - values Is the CAAR statistically Significant?
-30+30 0.0125 0.4908 0.6236 No
-25+25 0.0248 1.0674 0.2858 No
-20+20 0.0199 0.9534 0.3404 No
-15+15 0.0052 0.2867 0.7744 No
-10+10 -
0.0020
-0.1306 0.8961 No
-5+5 0.0039 0.3603 0.7186 No
-3+3 0.0077 0.8883 0.3744 No
*at 5% significance level 
Note:  Table 2 shows the results for the CAAR, t-tests and the p-values over different
event windows.  The p-values shows the significance of the t-test.  Significance tests
were done at 95% confidence level. 
The  table  shows the  p-values  calculated  for  different  event  windows.  The  p-values
indicates the level of significance at which the null hypothesis will be rejected. Higher
the p-values increase the probability of accepting the null hypothesis. The t-test were
run at 5% significance level. The CAAR is not significant at any of the event windows.
Therefore, the null  hypothesis which states that spin-off transactions do not produce
positive CAAR was rejected.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for parent companies listed on
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), for Spin-off transactions for a period of
2006 - 2016 for an event window period (-30, 30) days.
4.4   Analysis of Sell-Off Results
A total of 41 companies were analyzed for the spin-off effect. The daily share returns
were extracted from Bloomberg terminal  between 2006 and 2016.  In  order  to  have
better  representation,  all  companies  within  this  period  were  considered  except  the
companies whose share returns are not available. The event study metrics software
was  used  to  generate  the  results.  The  event  list,  dataset  and  return  model  were
imported into the software to generate the results analysed below.
The AAR result was presented in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 addresses the second null
hypothesis  which  states  that  the  difference  between  pre-announcement  CAAR  is
greater than post-announcement for sell-off announcement; therefore CAAR = 0 around
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announcement dates. Section 4.8 then addresses the last hypothesis which states that
the difference between pre-announcement CAAR is greater than post-announcement
CAAR for sell-off announcement. Different event windows of;  +  3 days, + 5 days, +10
days, + 15 days, +20 days, +25 days and +30 days were tested.
4.5  Average Abnormal Returns for sell-off announcements
The sample of the study for sell-off consisted of 41 JSE listed companies and it focused
on deals announced and concluded from 2006 to 2016. Detailed results of the AAR for
all the event windows can be found in table 3. 
Table. 3, shows the AAR over the event window for the period over 61 days (-30, 0,
+30). Day 0 will be the announcement date. 
Day 0, which is the day of announcement showed the highest AAR of 0.83%. The AAR
for subsequent days, up to the 7th days all showed a negative AAR, except for day 1.
Specifically for the post-event window, day 1, 8, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
26 and 29 produced a positive AAR while day 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 15, 23, 24, 25,
27, 28 and 30 all produced a negative AAR. For the pre-event window AAR, day 1, 2, 4,
5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22 and 26 produced a positive AAR while day 3, 8, 10,
12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29 and 30 all produced a negative AAR. The total
AAR for the pre-event window of 30 days was a marginal positive of 0.12% with an
average of 0.004%. While the pre-event window produced a positive AAR, the post-
event window produced a negative of -0.02%
Table 3: Sample Daily Statistics of AAR for Sell-off announcements.
Full Sample AAR
Mean -0.1612%
Medium 0.0581%
Standard Deviation 0.0812%
Minimum -0.9557%
Maximum 1.0662%
T-test -1.9847
p-value 0.0259
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The mean, medium and standard deviation were calculated over the event window. The
mean AAR is -0.1612%, maximum AAR 1.0662%, and the minimum AAR -0.9557%.
The  mean  is  negative  and  close  to  zero.  This  implies  that  most  companies  have
average abnormal returns close to zero. The standard deviation is 0.0812%. 
With a test statistic of -1.9847 and p-value of 0.0259, we accept the null hypothesis at a
5% level of significance since the p-value of 0.0259 is greater than 0.05. It therefore
means that sell-off transactions do not generate abnormal returns.
4.6  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for sell-off announcements.
In this section, the CAARs results will  be analyzed together with the AARs over the
event window period. Cumulative average abnormal returns were computed using the
AARs and these results are presented in table 4 and graphically as shown in figure 2
below. 
The post-announcement CAAR showed a negative impact on most of the days except
for day 1 – 5 and from day 21 – 24. Over the 30 days window period, the CAAR showed
a negative of -10.11%, with an average of -0.33%. The result clearly shows that sell-offs
have a negative impact on the share price of the parent company. This result supports
Emily et al., (2014) findings that sell-off transactions destroy shareholders’ wealth. In
conclusion, sell-off transactions destroyed shareholders’ wealth both in the short term
and long term.
The pre-announcement CAAR showed a positive impact on most of the days. Over the
30 days window period, the CAAR was -0.67% with an average of -0.02%.
Below is a calculation of the difference between pre and post announcement cumulative
average abnormal returns:
Pre-CAAR = -0.67
Post-CAAR = -10.11
Difference = -10.78% 
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The results show that there is a difference of -10.78%, which is less than zero. The null
hypothesis is therefore accepted.
Table 4: Daily T-test results for the parent firms for Sell-off transactions.
Date CAAR t-stat P - value Is the CAAR statistically significant?
-30+30 -0.0124 -0.4356 0.6631 No
-25+25 -0.0151 -0.5819 0.5607 No
-20+20 -0.0041 -0.1751 0.8610 No
-15+15 -0.0180 -0.8924 0.3722 No
-10+10 -0.0061 -0.3695 0.7118 No
-5+5 0.0046 0.3827 0.7019 No
-3+3 0.0083 0.8616 0.3889 No
*at 5% significance level
Note:  Table 4 shows the results for the CAAR, t-tests and the p-values over different
event windows. The p-values show the significance of the t-test. Significance tests were
done at 95% confidence level. 
The  table  shows the  p-values  calculated  for  different  event  windows.  The  p-values
indicate the level of significance at which the null hypothesis will be rejected. Higher p-
values increase the probability of accepting the null hypothesis. The t-tests were run at
5% significance level. The CAAR is not significant at any of the event windows.
Therefore, the null hypothesis was accepted since the difference between pre and post-
announcement returns is less than zero
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Figure 2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for parent companies listed on
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), for Sell-off transactions for the period
2006 - 2016 for an event window period (-30, 30) days.
4.7    Post-announcement spin-off CAARs vs post-announcement sell-off CAARs
The last hypothesis will compare the post-announcement CAARs for both spin-off and
sell-off transactions. The null hypothesis states that the post-announcement CAARs for
the spin-off transactions is higher than the post-announcement CAARs for sell-off.
In section 4.4, the average post-announcement CAARs for spin-off between 2006 and
2016 for the 30 days event window was 0.74%, with a total CAAR of 22.24%. In section
4.7, the average post-announcement CAARs for sell-off between 2006 and 2016 for the
30 days event window was 0.033%, with a total CAAR of -10.11%.
Table 5. EVENTWINDOW [-30,30]                                                                                     
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAAR)Divestiture
Type
Number
of Obs.
Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Median Maximum
       
Sell- Offs 61 -0.1612%  0.6343% -1.5514% -0.1983% 1.3387%
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Spin-Offs 61 0.2654% 0.7508% -0.6974% -0.006995% 2.1287%
Critical Value 2.359
T – Stat 3.3895
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level of significance. The null hypothesis was
rejected as the T-stat of 3.3895 was higher than the critical value of 2.358. The P–value
was found to be significant. In conclusion, there appears to be significant evidence that
the CAAR for  spin-offs  transactions seems to  be higher  than the CAAR of  sell-offs
transactions. 
This  result  contradicts  the  result  of  Emily,  et  al.,  (2014)  findings.  Their  findings
concluded that sell-off transactions produced a higher CAAR than spin-off transactions
for long term impact. The same cannot be said for the short term impact considered in
this research. For short term impact, spin-off transactions produced a higher CAAR than
sell-off transactions.
4.8  Other Return Models
This research has used the 2-factor APT return model that is generally accepted and
suited to explain the peculiarity of the South Africa market returns. In addition to this
model, other models such the Constant-Mean Return Model and Matched Firms are
available on the event study metrics software at the Department of Finance and Tax,
University of Cape Town. These other models will give room for some comparison to
see how they perform.
4.9  Constant Mean Return Model
The Constant  Mean Return  Model  can also be used to  perform event  study return
model. The basic assumption here is that, expected asset returns can differ between
companies,  but  they are  the  same or  constant  over  time.  This  method is  generally
believed to be simple to use in comparison to other models. According to Brown and
Warner (1980, 1985), this returns model can produce results that are close to those of a
more complex model.
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According to Campbell and MacKinley (1998), the basic assumption of this model is
that, an asset’s return is independent and normally distributed over time. “The model
allows for the returns on different assets to be contemporaneously correlated but the
correlations are constant over time” (Campbell et al., 1998, p.1).
The result of  the Constant Mean Return model for  Spin-off transactions is analysed
below. The sample of the study for spin-off consisted of 36 companies listed on JSE, for
deals announced and concluded from 2006 to 2016.
Table 6: Daily T-test results for the parent firms for Sell-off transactions.
Date CAAR T-Stat P-Values Is  the  CAAR  Statistically
Significant?
-30+30 -0.0254 -1.0132 0.3110 No
-25+25 -0.0068 -0.2977 0.7659 No
-20+20 -0.0056 -0.2707 0.7867 No
-15+15 -0.0140 -0.7865 0.4316 No
-10+10 -0.0150 -1.0198 0.3078 No
-5+5 -0.0029 -0.2759 0.7827 No
-3+3 0.0033 0.3906 0.6389 No
-0+0 0.0144 3.5432 0.0004 Yes
*at 5% significance level
Note: Table 6 presents the results for the paired t-tests for CAARS for 30 days, 25 days,
20 days, 15 days, 10 days, 5 days, 3 days and day 0 which present the announcement
date. The CAAR, The t-stats and p-values are presented. Significance tests were done
at 95% confidence level. 
The CAAR for an event window of 30 days was -0.0254; 25 days was -0.0068; 20 days
was -0.0056; 15 days was -0.014; 10 days was -0.015; 5 days was -0.0029. All showed
a negative CAAR except  for  the event  window of  3 days and the event  day which
showed a positive of 0.0033 and 0.0114 respectively. The result is also not statistically
significant with high p-values for the different event windows analysed, except for the
announcement date which showed a p-value of 0.0004 which is statistically significant.
This research was conducted for both Spin-off transactions and Sell-off transactions.
The result  of  the Constant  Mean Return model  for  Sell-off  transactions is  analysed
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below. The sample of the study for spin-off consisted of 41 companies listed on JSE and
was of deals announced and concluded from 2006 to 2016.
Table 7: Daily T-test results for the parent firms for Sell-off transactions.
Date CAAR T-Stat P-Values Is  the  CAAR  Statistically
Significant?
-30+30 -0.0433 -1.565 0.1176 No
-25+25 -0.0411 -1.6243 0.1043 No
-20+20 -0.0254 -1.117 0.264 No
-15+15 -0.0341 -1.7286 0.0839 No
-10+10 -0.0172 -1.0608 0.2888 No
-5+5 -0.0014 -0.1154 0.9081 No
-3+3 0.0044 0.4693 0.6389 No
-0+0 0.0076 2.1469 0.0318 No
*at 5% significance level
Note: Table 7 presents the results for the paired t-tests for CAARS for 30 days, 25 days,
20 days, 15 days, 10 days, 5 days, 3 days and day 0 which present the announcement
date. The CAAR, The t-stats and p-values are presented. Significance tests were done
at 95% confidence level. 
The CAAR for an event window of 30 days was -0.0433; 25 days was -0.0411; 20 days
was -0.0254;  15 days was -0.0341;  10 days was -0.0172;  5  days was -0.0014.  All
showed a negative CAAR except for the event window of 3 days and the event day
which  showed a  positive  of  0.0044 and 0.0076 respectively. The  result  is  also  not
statistically significant with high p-values for the different event window analysed.
4.10 Matched Firms (Portfolios) Model
Lyon, Barber, and Tsai  (1999) proposed the use of matched firms (Portfolio)  model.
They proposed the use of a portfolio matched by size and market-to-book ratio as a
measure of normal returns for each event. In order to use the matched firms (portfolio)
approach, a reference firm (portfolio) to each event must be specified. In place of the
size and market-to-book ratio which they used in their study, the JSE Resources 20
index ("Resi") and the JSE financial and industrial 30 index ("Findi") were used. The
shares of the parent companies have been categorized as either FINDI or RESI as
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extracted from Bloomberg. Two additional columns were created in both the dataset and
event list. The daily FINDI and RESI daily returns were extracted from Bloomberg for
the study period. The returns were then imported into the software to generate the result
below. These results will  be analysed in two parts: the Spin-off transactions and the
Sell-off transactions.
Table 8: Daily T-test results for the parent firms for Spin-off transactions.
Date CAAR T-Stat P-Values Is  the  CAAR  Statistically
Significant?
-30+30 -0.0098 -0.7470 0.4551 No
-25+25 -0.0020 0.0720 0.9426 No
-20+20 0.0057 0.3336 0.7387 No
-15+15 -0.0004 -0.0637 0.9492 No
-10+10 -0.0119 -0.9876 0.3233 No
-5+5 -0.0019 -0.1415 0.8875 No
-3+3 0.0057 0.7259 0.4679 No
-0+0 0.0089 1.5073 0.1317 No
*at 5% significance level
Note: Table 8 presents the results for the paired t-tests for CAARS for 30 days, 25 days,
20 days, 15 days, 10 days, 5 days, 3 days and day 0 which present the announcement
date. The CAAR, The t-stats and p-values are presented. Significance tests were done
at 95% confidence level. 
The  table  shows the  p-values  calculated  for  different  event  windows.  The  p-values
indicate the level of significance at which the null hypothesis will be rejected. Higher p-
values increase the probability of accepting the null hypothesis. The t-tests were run at
5% significance level. The CAAR is not significant at any of the event windows.
The CAAR for an event window of 30 days was -0.0098; 25 days was 0.0020; 20 days
was 0.0057; 15 days was -0.0004; 10 days was -0.0119; 5 days was -0.0019; 3 days
was 0.0057. The announcement date produced a positive CAAR of 0.0089.  All showed
a negative CAAR except for the event window of 25 days, 20 days, 3 days and the
event day which showed a positive of 0.0020, 0.0057, 0.0057 and 0.0089 respectively.
The result is also not statistically significant with high p-values for the different event
windows analysed.
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Table 9: Daily T-test results for the parent firms for Sell-off transactions.
Date CAAR T-Stat P-Values Is  the  CAAR  Statistically
Significant?
-30+30 -0.0258 -1.0073 0.3138 No
-25+25 -0.0268 -1.1510 0.2497 No
-20+20 0.0189 -0.9554 0.3394 No
-15+15 -0.0294 -1.7252 0.0845 No
-10+10 -0.0136 -0.8765 0.3807 No
-5+5 0.0047 0.4267 0.6696 No
-3+3 0.0069 0.8850 0.3762 No
-0+0 0.0059 1.4058 0.1598 No
*at 5% significance level
Note: Table 9 presents the results for the paired t-tests for CAARS for 30 days, 25 days,
20 days, 15 days, 10 days, 5 days, 3 days and day 0 which present the announcement
date. The CAAR, The t-stats and p-values are presented. Significance tests were done
at 95% confidence level. 
The table below shows the  p-values calculated  for  different  event  windows.  The p-
values indicate the level of significance at which the null hypothesis will  be rejected.
Higher p-values increase the probability of accepting the null  hypothesis. The t-tests
were run at 5% significance level.  The CAAR is  not  significant  at  any of  the event
windows.
The CAAR for event window of 30 days was -0.0258; 25 days was -0.0268; 20 days
was -0.0189; 15 days was -0.0294; 10 days was -0.0136; 5 days was 0.0047; 3 days
was 0.0069. The announcement date produced a positive CAAR of 0.0059.  All showed
a negative CAAR except for the event window of 5 days, 3 days and the event day
which showed a positive of 0.0047, 0.0069, and 0.0059 respectively. The result is also
not statistically significant with high p-values for the different event windows which were
analysed. 
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4.11 Chapter Summary
The  chapter  examined  the  impact  of  spin-off  and  sell-off  transactions  on  share
performance of JSE listed parent companies between 2006 and 2016. For spin-offs, it
was found that  parent  companies yield  positive abnormal  returns while  for  sell-offs,
parent companies yield negative abnormal returns.
The second hypothesis for spin-off parent's company was rejected which implies that
the  pre-announcement  CAAR  is  not  higher  than  the  post-announcement  CAAR.
However,  for  sell-off  parent's  company,  this  hypothesis  was  accepted.  It  therefore
means that the pre-announcement CAAR is higher than the post-announcement CAAR.
The  last  hypothesis  confirms  that  the  spin-off  produces  a  better  result  for  parent
companies when compared to sell-offs i.e., spin-off transactions are a better form of
divestiture in South Africa and should therefore be embraced.
The result of this research when compared to Emily et al., (2014) can be summarized
as follows: Sell-off transactions and Spin-off transactions destroy shareholders’ wealth
in the long term. Spin-off transactions add values in the short term. The findings of this
study also show that spin-off transactions are a better way to divest in South Africa,
especially in the short term. Findings by Emily et al., (2014) contradict this result; their
results  indicated that  sell-off  transactions are a better way to divest  in South Africa
because they produced a higher CAAR when compared to spin-off transactions.
Lastly, the Constant Mean Adjusted Return and Matched Firm (Portfolios) model was
adopted to analyse the data, but the intention here was not for any comparison. The
APT two-factor model has been widely accepted as the best return model that explains
the peculiarity of the South African market.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.0 Introduction 
This  chapter  provides  a  summary  of  the  findings  in  Chapter  4  and  suggested
recommendations for further study. 
5.1 Conclusion
The study sought to establish if divestiture has any impact on the share performance of
parent companies, with a focus on spin-off transactions and sell-off transactions. The
study looked at 36 JSE companies listed for spin-off companies and 41 companies for
sell-off. The divestitures announcements were made between 2006 and 2016. A 61-day
event window was used to conduct the event study and determine if there was any real
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or positive impact on the share performance of the parent company. The findings show
that the announcements of divestitures produced different results for spin-off and sell-
off.  Spin-off  transactions  have  an  impact  on  the  share  performance  of  the  parent
companies. The cumulative average abnormal returns for the parent companies were
significantly different from zero over the event window used. This implies that spin-off
transactions do create positive abnormal returns. The opposite is true for sell-off parent
companies i.e., sell-off transactions do not create positive abnormal returns.
The pre-announcement and post-announcement cumulative average abnormal returns
were also compared for both spin-off and sell-off parent companies. The results show
that there is a positive difference, which is greater than 0 for the spin-off transactions,
and as such the null hypothesis was rejected. However, for sell-off parent companies,
the difference is less than 0 and as such the null hypothesis was accepted. 
Lastly, a comparison was also made between the spin-off and sell-off transactions, i.e.,
which  one  produces  a  higher  return  for  the  parent  companies.  This  was  done  to
investigate if there are any significant positive differences between the two. The results
show that spin-off transactions produce better returns than sell-off transactions in South
Africa.
5.2 Recommendations
Event study research is generally conducted using different returns model.  The APT
two-factor model has been proven to be the most suitable for South Africa according to
Van Rensburg (2001). Other markets, whether emerging or developed, use whatever
return model that has been proven to be appropriate for the market. Future studies can
be conducted to use different return models on the same set of data to see if the result
generated will be significantly different. The researcher recommends that studies should
be carried out to examine long-term effects. The results from such studies can then be
compared with the ones on short-term effects to establish if there are any significant
differences.  In  addition,  the appropriate return model  that fits  a particular  market or
stock exchange can also be investigated. 
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Another topic for further research will be the impact of divestiture announcements on
the buyers in South Africa. Bhana (2004), Emily at el. (2014) and this research has
succeeded in only investigating the effect on divestiture on the sellers while ignoring the
impact on the buyers.
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Appendix 
Table 1: AARs of total sample over the event window period for Spin-off 
announcements
Pre Event 
Windows
AAR % Post 
Event 
Windows
AAR %
-30 0.0016 0.16 30 -0.0024 -0.24
-29 -0.0045 -0.45 29 0.0010 0.10
-28 -0.0031 -0.31 28 -0.0037 -0.37
-27 -0.0010 -0.10 27 -0.0009 -0.09
-26 0.0002 0.02 26 -0.0015 -0.15
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-25 0.0032 0.32 25 -0.0003 -0.03
-24 0.0031 0.31 24 0.0026 0.26
-23 -0.0002 -0.02 23 0.0024 0.24
-22 -0.0047 -0.47 22 -0.0079 -0.79
-21 -0.0009 -0.09 21 0.0076 0.76
-20 -0.0004 -0.04 20 0.0097 0.97
-19 0.0002 0.02 19 0.0023 0.23
-18 -0.0002 -0.02 18 0.0024 0.24
-17 0.0011 0.11 17 0.0006 0.06
-16 0.0044 0.44 16 -0.0053 -0.53
-15 0.0046 0.46 15 -0.0060 -0.60
-14 0.0026 0.26 14 0.0028 0.28
-13 -0.0022 -0.22 13 0.0036 0.36
-12 -0.0056 -0.56 12 0.0052 0.52
-11 0.0017 0.17 11 0.0004 0.04
-10 -0.0002 -0.02 10 0.0012 0.12
-9 0.0001 0.01 9 -0.0061 -0.61
-8 -0.0002 -0.02 8 -0.0019 -0.19
-7 0.0002 0.02 7 0.0032 0.32
-6 -0.0017 -0.17 6 -0.0005 -0.05
-5 0.0018 0.18 5 -0.0003 -0.03
-4 -0.0052 -0.52 4 -0.0005 -0.05
-3 -0.0007 -0.07 3 -0.0005 -0.05
-2 0.0059 0.59 2 -0.0036 -0.36
-1 -0.0027 -0.27 1 -0.0028 -0.28
0 0.011985 1.19 0 0.011985 1.19
Total -0.28 Total 0.09
Average -0.0093% Average 0.003%
Table 2: CAARs of total sample over the event window period for Spin-off 
announcements
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Pre-event 
Windows
CAAR % Post-
event 
Windows
CAAR %
-30 0.0016 0.16 30 0.0125 1.25
-29 -0.0029 -0.29 29 0.0149 1.49
-28 -0.0059 -0.59 28 0.0139 1.39
-27 -0.0070 -0.70 27 0.0175 1.75
-26 -0.0068 -0.68 26 0.0166 1.66
-25 -0.0035 -0.35 25 0.0181 1.81
-24 -0.0004 -0.04 24 0.0184 1.84
-23 -0.0006 -0.06 23 0.0158 1.58
-22 -0.0054 -0.54 22 0.0133 1.33
-21 -0.0063 -0.63 21 0.0213 2.13
-20 -0.0067 -0.67 20 0.0136 1.36
-19 -0.0065 -0.65 19 0.0040 0.40
-18 -0.0067 -0.67 18 0.0016 0.16
-17 -0.0056 -0.56 17 -0.0007 -0.07
-16 -0.0012 -0.12 16 -0.0013 -0.13
-15 0.0034 0.34 15 0.0040 0.40
-14 0.0060 0.60 14 0.0100 1.00
-13 0.0038 0.38 13 0.0071 0.71
-12 -0.0018 -0.18 12 0.0036 0.36
-11 -0.0007 -0.07 11 -0.0017 -0.17
-10 -0.0003 -0.03 10 -0.0020 -0.20
-9 -0.0002 -0.02 9 -0.0032 -0.32
-8 -0.0004 -0.04 8 0.0029 0.29
-7 -0.0002 -0.02 7 0.0047 0.47
-6 -0.0019 -0.19 6 0.0016 0.16
-5 -0.0008 -0.08 5 0.0020 0.20
-4 -0.0053 -0.53 4 0.0023 0.23
-3 -0.0060 -0.60 3 0.0024 0.24
-2 -0.0001 -0.01 2 0.0028 0.28
-1 -0.0028 -0.28 1 0.0064 0.64
0 0.009206 0.92 0 0.009206 0.92
Total -7.11 Total 22.24
Average -0.24% Average 0.74%
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Table 3: AARs of total sample over the event window period for Sell-off 
announcements.
Pre Event 
Windows
AAR % Post 
Event 
Windows
AAR %
-30 0.0022 0.22 30 -0.0064 -0.64
-29 0.0046 0.46 29 0.0031 0.31
-28 0.0021 0.21 28 -0.0042 -0.42
-27 -0.0039 -0.39 27 -0.0008 -0.08
-26 0.0034 0.34 26 0.0043 0.43
-25 -0.0047 0.47 25 -0.0077 -0.77
-24 -0.0037 0.37 24 -0.0004 -0.04
-23 -0.0024 -0.24 23 -0.0082 -0.82
-22 0.0014 0.14 22 0.0081 0.81
-21 0.0029 0.29 21 0.0036 0.36
-20 0.0029 0.29 20 0.0032 0.32
-19 -0.0030 -0.30 19 0.0038 0.38
-18 -0.0015 -0.15 18 0.0011 0.11
-17 -0.0066 -0.66 17 0.0005 0.05
-16 0.0087 0.87 16 0.0047 0.47
-15 -0.0062 -0.62 15 -0.0051 -0.51
-14 0.0029 0.29 14 -0.0022 -0.22
-13 0.0005 0.05 13 0.0008 0.08
-12 -0.005 -0.05 12 0.0018 0.18
-11 0.0013 0.13 11 -0.0005 -0.05
-10 -0.0015 -0.15 10 -0.0044 -0.44
-9 0.0013 0.13 9 -0.0016 -0.16
-8 -0.0013 -0.13 8 0.0023 0.23
-7 0.0015 0.15 7 -0.0057 -0.57
-6 0.0018 0.18 6 -0.0031 -0.31
-5 0.0009 0.09 5 -0.0047 -0.47
-4 0.0002 0.02 4 -0.0001 -0.01
-3 -0.0060 -0.60 3 -0.0026 -0.26
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-2 0.0056 0.56 2 -0.0035 -0.35
-1 0.0026 0.26 1 0.0039 0.39
0 0.0083 0.83 0 0.0083 0.83
Total 0.12 Total -0.02
Average 0.004 Average -0.0006
Table 4: CAARs of total sample over the event window period for Sell-off 
announcements.
Pre-event 
Windows
CAAR % Post-event 
Windows
CAAR %
-30 0.0022 0.22 30 -0.0124 -1.24
-29 0.0069 0.69 29 -0.0059 -0.59
-28 0.0090 0.90 28 -0.0072 -0.72
-27 0.0051 0.51 27 -0.0030 -0.30
-26 0.0086 0.86 26 -0.0022 -0.22
-25 0.0039 0.39 25 -0.0065 -0.65
-24 0.0002 0.02 24 0.0012 0.12
-23 -0.0023 -0.23 23 0.0016 0.16
-22 -0.0008 -0.08 22 0.0098 0.98
-21 0.0021 0.21 21 0.0017 0.17
-20 0.0050 0.50 20 -0.0020 -0.20
-19 0.0019 0.19 19 -0.0052 -0.52
-18 0.0004 0.04 18 -0.0090 -0.90
-17 -0.0062 -0.62 17 -0.0102 -1.02
-16 0.0025 0.25 16 -0.0108 -1.08
-15 -0.0037 -0.37 15 -0.0155 -1.55
-14 -0.0007 -0.07 14 -0.0104 -1.04
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-13 -0.0001 -0.01 13 -0.0081 -0.81
-12 -0.0054 -0.54 12 -0.0090 -0.90
-11 -0.0041 -0.41 11 -0.0108 -1.08
-10 -0.0057 -0.57 10 -0.0102 -1.02
-9 -0.0044 -0.44 9 -0.0058 -0.58
-8 -0.0057 -0.57 8 -0.0041 -0.41
-7 -0.0041 -0.41 7 -0.0065 -0.65
-6 -0.0023 -0.23 6 -0.0007 -0.07
-5 -0.0013 -0.13 5 0.0023 0.23
-4 -0.0010 -0.10 4 0.0071 0.71
-3 -0.0070 -0.70 3 0.0072 0.72
-2 -0.0014 -0.14 2 0.0099 0.99
-1 0.0012 0.12 1 0.0134 1.34
0 0.0083 0.83 0 0.083 0.83
Total -0.67 Total -10.11
Average -0.02 Average -0.33
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